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Abstract
Denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) are serious threats
to computer networks. DoS and DDoS attacks aim to shut down a target server by
depleting its resources and rendering it incapable of offering stable and integrated
service to legitimate clients. Preventing DoS and DDoS attacks is a difficult task.
A promising countermeasure against DoS attacks is the Client Puzzle method, which
nevertheless faces a number of challenges, such as the complexity of puzzle construction
and solution verification.
Our research focuses on exploring novel puzzle constructions to satisfy the high
demands of DoS defence in practice. In this thesis, we first identify the underlying
weaknesses of existing client puzzles. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we recommend
the necessary requirements for good client puzzles. Based on this, we propose a new
model for puzzle distribution, called the Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System (TCPS).
Two specific schemes are presented to construct puzzles within TCPS. We depict these
two schemes, where each trapdoor algorithm is applied respectively. Both schemes
have two distinct features: the computational overheads are low, and the difficulty
level of puzzles is measurable. Moreover, both puzzle schemes are provably secure
under traditional hard problems in mathematics.
Our contribution to client puzzle defence against DoS attacks can be summarised
as follows:
• Identify the shortcomings of existing client puzzles.
• Recommend the requirements of good client puzzles.
• Formally define the Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System, along with strict se-
curity conditions.
• Propose a client puzzle scheme whose security is based on the RSA Assumption.
Effectiveness and security are analysed and proven.
vi
• Propose a second client puzzle scheme whose security is based on the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP). Similarly, effectiveness and security are also analysed.
• Provide a possible configuration for system parameters.
• Discuss further possible attacks and their solutions.
As our research is carried out in DoS attack scenarios, we also introduce this tech-
nical background before our achievements are presented.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Service Availability
Today’s Internet has successfully fulfilled the expectation of empowering a single com-
puter to service remote requests from millions of geographically dispersed clients. With
this significant power, the Internet has been widely applied in our society, and has in-
creasingly become a prevalent part of human lives. People enjoy and benefit greatly
from a number of fresh nouns that belong to a new information era: eBusiness, eCom-
merce, eEducation, eGovernment, eHealth and so on. In consequence, the issue of how
to supply these network services reliably and securely to legitimate clients is a growing
concern among network engineers and researchers.
Generally, authentication, integrity and confidentiality are the most important prin-
ciples of network security. However, recent reports about a number of prominent Inter-
net service providers that broke down because of malicious attacks [2, 3, 66, 68] urge
people to realise that all security principles must be based on service availability. It
is clear that no one can evaluate the quality of an online service that is not available.
“Availability” in this context refers to a service that can be accessed within a rea-
sonable amount of waiting time after a legitimate client sends a request. Table (1.1)
illustrates these general security goals and their corresponding threats.
Goal Security Threat
Information Confidentiality Exposure of Information
Information Integrity Modifying/Injecting Information
Information Authentication Forged Information
Service Availability Denial of Service
Table 1.1: General Security Goals and Threats
1
1.2. Overview of DoS Attacks 2
The service availability of a network server can be destructed in a variety of ways,
such as internal bugs within a system, hardware limits, or malicious attacks from
outside. Denial of Service (DoS) is the term we use to refer to the results of any inten-
tional or accidental actions that can successfully make a legitimate service unavailable
for legitimate users.
Since other DoS threats are relatively easy to deal with, this thesis will focus only
on the study of malicious DoS attacks launched via the Internet. By analysing existing
countermeasures against DoS attacks and their inherent problems, we will propose a
new defence scheme, which is expected to be efficient and effective in both practice and
theory.
1.2 Overview of DoS Attacks
D. Howard [32] presented a comprehensive definition of DoS:
If computer hardware, software, and data are not kept available, productivity can
be degraded, even if nothing has been damaged. Denial of Service can be conceived
to include both intentional and unintentional assaults on a system’s availability.
The most comprehensive perspective would be that regardless of the cause, if a
service is supposed to be available and it is not, then service has been denied.
Network-based DoS attacks, in particular, denote malicious actions which aim at shut-
ting down a target server and destructing its service availability. These attacks usually
attempt to block or degrade service in a designated period temporarily, rather than
intrude on the server directly or damage the data permanently. Similar attack scenar-
ios can be found in the real world: a malicious client repeatedly uses distinct bogus
names, phone numbers and credit card numbers to deceive a hotel receptionist into
reserving rooms for him, which as a result, are not available for other legitimate clients
in a certain period. This is a typical DoS attack.
A Cyberworld DoS attack is designed to flood numerous spurious requests to a
server, crushing its infrastructure, depleting its bandwidth, computational capacity or
system stack memory, and eventually crashing it. In consequence, legitimate clients
have to experience a service downtime, and victim servers may lose millions of dollars.
One of the most popular DoS attacks, TCP SYN flooding attacks, were reported by
several major newspapers in 1996 [2, 3, 20, 68]. These attacks succeeded in crippling
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Panix, a major New York Internet service provider, in early September 1996, and
created similar problems for the website of the New York Times just a few days later.
As a rule, a SYN flooding attacker exploits spoofed IP addresses to mount a large
number of initial and unresolved connection requests to a victim server, depleting its
resources and rendering it incapable of responding to legitimate clients. According
to an advisory issued by CERT on September 19th, 1996 [59], several underground
magazines pushed the spread of DoS attacks ahead by publishing source codes and
automated tools for launching TCP SYN flooding attacks.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) was rapidly brought to the public’s attention
after eBay, Amazon, Yahoo and several other prominent commercial websites fell victim
to this new form of DoS attacks on February 9th, 2000 [16, 66]. Relying on the fast
spread of Internet worms [15], a DDoS attacker is able to easily manipulate thousands
of vulnerable computers in the Internet to launch a large-scale DoS attack to a target.
Compared with traditional ones, the strength of DDoS attacks can be multiplied by
10, 100, or even 1000, and the effect on the Internet is therefore immeasurable.
In a worse case scenario, as the above incidents have demonstrated, even if an
Internet server possesses very large bandwidth and resources, and is protected by a
reliable firewall system, it is still vulnerable to a range of Denial of Service attacks.
1.3 Previous Work
A countermeasure against bogus clients is to perform authentication before any com-
munication and resource allocation. However, conventional authentication schemes
based on public-key technology (for example, RSA and DSS) will no longer meet the
demand for DoS defence. This is because most of them require a server to conduct
expensive computations, such as modular exponentiation, and store a large amount of
session information for each client, which actually opens up new opportunities for DoS
attacks. Therefore, a more effective and inexpensive approach to defend against DoS
attacks is desirable.
So far, several approaches have been proposed in the literature [34, 33, 44, 43],
among which Client Puzzle is one of the most notable and influential. Earlier work
[7, 5, 33] showed that the client puzzle mechanism is capable of alleviating or confining
DoS attacks to a harmless level in theory. The aim of client puzzles is to destroy DoS
attacks by forcing every suspected adversary to consume a number of computational
resources for authentication, before he/she is granted access to the resources of a server.
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In contrast to traditional authentications, client puzzles seem weak, yet are inexpensive
and efficient in determining whether a connection request is sent by network worms
[15, 63].
The idea of client puzzles was first introduced as an access control mechanism by
Dwork and Naor in 1992 [22]. They proposed a system for junk mail defence, in which
every successful delivery of a message requires the sender to solve a small cryptographic
puzzle. By doing so, they successfully impose a large amount of computational costs
on sending mass mails, while for legitimate clients, the costs to compute single puzzles
are negligible.
Combining the idea of a stateless protocol [4] and Client Puzzle, Juels and Brainard
[33] proposed a Client Puzzle Protocol to protect network servers against SYN flooding
attacks. This protocol emphasises that no memory should be allocated before client
authentication, and that the client is the one who pays for the authentication. Generally
speaking, when there is no DoS attack alarm, a defending server accepts and responds
to connection requests as normal. However, if the server is suspected of being under
attacks, it will send a small cryptographic puzzle to each client applying for a service,
before allocating any system resources to them. Only the request belonging to the
client who returns the correct answer will proceed. The cost of computing a single
puzzle is trivial for legitimate clients, yet unbearably expensive for a DoS attacker who
attempts to consume considerable resources from the server. Moreover, the complexity
of cryptographic puzzles can be adjusted by an administrator, according to the strength
of the attack he/she receives. In their paper, Juels and Brainard also presented a simple
puzzle construction to implement their protocol, although this seemed unsatisfactory
and caused a lot of arguments in network forums [19, 48, 65].
Following this, a few researchers attempted to improve puzzle construction within
the framework of the Client Puzzle Protocol. Aura and Nikander [5] proposed a hash
function based puzzle scheme, in which a client needs a brute-force search for the correct
answer, and a server performs a hash function to verify the solution. Waters and Juels
[6] suggested a new technique that permits the outsourcing of puzzles. However, even
puzzles can be used by different servers, and the solution of a puzzle still requires one
modular exponentiation for every defending server.
In general, these proposed puzzle schemes are less capable of meeting the require-
ments of client puzzles. Improper usage of these unqualified puzzles, on the other hand,
will lead to DoS attacks.
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1.4 The Challenge
The aim of this study is to redefine the essential requirements of client puzzles, and to
establish a generic client puzzle system which is appropriate and secure enough to be
embedded in the Client Puzzle Protocol [33].
It is desirable that this system should possess two prominent characteristics. One
is that most of the computations for puzzle generation can be fulfilled in a pre-
construction phase, independent of a puzzle construction. Pre-construction can be
processed during idle time, and items calculated in this phase can be reused by com-
bining them with time parameters. The other important feature is a quick verification.
No computation occurs in the verification phase, which makes DoS attacks aiming at
flooding bogus solutions to exhaust system resources impossible. Moreover, the com-
plexity of puzzles in the system proposed in this thesis are parameterised and can be
adjusted flexibly, according to the strength of DoS attacks.
We will propose two novel trapdoor algorithms to implement this client puzzle sys-
tem. Both of them are provably secure under the assumptions of well-known hard
problems such as Discrete Logarithm Problem and Factorisation [36, 50]. We will
demonstrate how a trapdoor puzzle can be generated by a defending server, and how
a client achieves the correct answer. By counting their respective workloads, the ad-
vantages of our scheme will be analysed in contrast with other proposed puzzles.
Our scheme is expected to overcome the potential problems of previous client puz-
zles, such as complicated construction and verification. We will demonstrate that our
puzzles are computationally efficient and properly cohere with existing Internet proto-
cols.
1.5 Thesis Organisation
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we will present the developing history of DoS attacks, and analyse
potential reasons for their existence. We will give a broad overview of DoS attacks
and their attack modes by depicting a number of prevalent examples, such as SYN
flooding, Smurf, and DDoS. Several proposed countermeasures will be described
in this chapter, along with an analysis of their advantages and disadvantages.
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• Chapter 3 will be devoted to the notion of client puzzles. Three relevant applica-
tions of cryptographic puzzles (including the Client Puzzle Protocol [33]) will be
addressed in this chapter. To clarify the problems we try to resolve in this thesis,
two proposed client puzzle schemes will be investigated. Note that Chapter 3
and Chapter 4 are intended to provide the background knowledge needed for the
following chapters.
• To solve current problems and enable client puzzles to prevent DoS attacks effec-
tively, we will propose a novel model for puzzle construction, called the Trapdoor-
based Client Puzzle System (TCPS). This model will consist of our new recom-
mendations about qualified client puzzles, and a series of security conditions. It
is hoped that puzzles generated from our proposed model will fulfill their original
promise against DoS attacks.
• We will develop two specific trapdoor algorithms and describe them in Chapter 5
and Chapter 6. Each individual algorithm can be used to implement an efficient
puzzle construction within our proposed model. We will demonstrate how the
TCPS work by employing these two algorithms, respectively. We will provide
rigorous proof of their security properties. Moreover, a number of possible attacks
will be considered at the end of both chapters, and the proposed puzzle schemes
are expected to resist all of them.
• In Chapter 7, we will provide the proper parameterisations for a defending system,
which will help our puzzle schemes work effectively in practice. Some discussion
about further attacks and security considerations will be presented.
• Chapter 8 is the conclusion, where we will summarise our work within this thesis,
together with a list about future research directions.
• The last part of this thesis comprises the references.
Chapter 2
Technical Background
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have been
around for years, but it seems that people still cannot find a proper way to deal with
them. This chapter intends to provide an overview of DoS/DDoS attacks, along with
several proposed countermeasures, which, it is hoped, will help readers understand the
problems that we try to solve in the following chapters.
This chapter will begin with a brief history of DoS attacks, which leads to a review
of their evolution. A discussion about why DoS attacks exist and are rapidly developing
follows. DoS attacks will be classified according to their characteristics, and several
notorious DoS attack approaches will also be described in this chapter. After that,
a number of current countermeasures against DoS attacks will be introduced, such as
Packet Marking, Filtering techniques, SYN cookies, and so on. These countermeasures’
objectives, working theories, merits and limitations will also be analysed.
2.1 A Brief History of DoS Attacks
Most people were not aware of the urgency of DoS attacks, until a number of famous
Internet service providers were brought down in February 1996. However, earlier than
this, in 1988, an incident happened which was ignored, maybe because the Internet was
relatively unknown at that time. The Morris worm, a self-replicating program created
by Robert T. Morris Jr., successfully disrupted the Internet for nearly 48 hours in the
city of California [53]. That was the first taste of DoS attacks.
After ten years of development, DoS attacks appear more sophisticated and difficult
to solve. Before 1999, DoS attackers might have exploited IP spoofing and flaws in
existing network protocols to mount attacks from a single source to a single target. A
7
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series of advisories issued by CERT [59, 56, 60, 57, 61] between 1996 and 1998 reported
these attacks, such as SYN flooding, Smurf, ping of death, etc.
In 1999, several Distributed Denial-of-Service tools (Trinoo, TFN and “stachel-
draht”) were reported by CERT [58] for the first time. The fear about larger-scale
attacks proved to be true by the events that happened in February, 2000, when em-
inent websites like Yahoo, CNN.com and Amazon, which were protected by powerful
firewall systems and possessed huge bandwidth and system resources, were still shut
down by DDoS attacks.
The most common process for launching DDoS attacks consists of three steps:
1. Scan vulnerable computers across a wide range of the Internet.
2. Intrude on these victims and install malicious scripts for mounting an attack.
According to different types of scripts, these infected computers are categorised
as “Masters” or “Zombies”.
3. An attacker communicates with “Masters” only, deploying them to transfer an
attack order to “Zombies”, which will finally mount the real attack.
Before 2000, most DDoS attacks were required to scan vulnerable victims manually,
and list them for later intrusion. The attacks took the form of multiple sources to a
single target at this stage.
From 1996 to 2000, several countermeasures against DoS/DDoS were proposed,
such as SYN cookies [8], Filtering mechanisms [25, 43], Congestion Control [41, 55],
etc. However, none of them seemed good enough to tackle and stop the violence of
DoS attacks.
Since 2001, the quick evolution of DDoS attacks is even more terrifying. Attackers
who deploy self-propagating network worms like the notorious Code Red and advanced
scanning strategies [63] can easily compromise more than ten thousand unwitting “ac-
complices” in a few hours. Stefan Savage, a network researcher from CAIDA (Super-
computer Center’s Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis) pointed out
that, “With that kind of firepower, they could have taken down anything” [31]. Scien-
tists admit that with a little improvement, Code Red could render an arbitrary network
incapable of communicating with the outside world. This is a new phase of DoS attacks
which can be launched from multiple sources to multiple targets.
Furthermore, communication between “Zombies” and “Masters” can be encrypted
by DoS tools such as “stacheldraht”, and be transferred via IRC channels [14] which
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offer anonymous service for their users. All of these factors make it more difficult to
detect and trace a DDoS attack.
2.2 Underlying Causes of DoS Attacks
2.2.1 Social Factors
Everything exists for a reason. If the first appearance of the Morris worm was due to
intellectual curiosity [53], the prevalence of DoS attacks nowadays has a much more
realistic basis in this for-profit society.
First of all, business or commerce being performed via the Internet means high
profit and time sensitiveness [28]. A successful DoS attack may lead to a victim losing
thousands of dollars per minute. Hence, a DoS attack may aim to commit a commercial
crime or take personal revenge. In addition, the purpose of bringing down popular Web
servers can also be to gain a reputation among hackers’ community.
More evidence indicates that the tools to automatically launch DoS attacks that
disperse within the Internet have become another serious problem. Even a network
illiterate can mount a considerable DoS attack by using these tools. This situation is
not acceptable in today’s Internet, where numerous monetary transactions are handled.
What we need is not only a good solution to defend against these DoS attack tools,
but also a complete policy to rule the activity of information providers in the Internet.
Unfortunately, this idea seems far from actual practice and difficult to achieve.
2.2.2 Architectural Factors
The Internet was created for functionality, not for security. It can supply worldwide
clients with quick, easy and inexpensive communication channels, and can be gradually
reinforced by diverse levels of network protocols that ensure the reliability and timely
delivery of communication. However, the booming growth of the Internet also leaves a
lot of concealed damage and other serious issues for security researchers.
One problem of the Internet is that network resource is limited and consumable [14].
Bandwidth, processing power or memory of a network device all have their maximum
capabilities. When a network computer provides service to a mass of remote clients,
it simultaneously creates the possibility of making a single computer fight against a
large number of network resources. If the goal of an attack is to deplete the victim’s
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resources, this can always be achieved in theory, as long as it carries with a sufficient
amount of resources, such as a large number of bogus connection requests. Actually,
this is why DDoS attacks are successful.
Another problem is that “Internet security is highly interdependent” [14]. For
example, DDoS attacks generally launch from systems or networks that are undermined
through security-related compromises. That means, no matter how perfectly the target
system might be protected, its susceptibility to DDoS attacks depends on the security
status of the rest of the global Internet.
The last but not the least issue is the hasty deployment of network protocols. Most
of them are designed to meet the demands of industry, and are hastily applied to
widespread network servers and routers. SYN Flooding and IP spoofing attacks aim
at the shortcomings of TCP/IP [46, 47]. A server based on SSL protocol [27] is subject
to DoS attacks, because the protocol requires the server to perform a computationally
expensive verification operation to initiate a SSL connection. An attacker may easily
overwhelm the server by flooding it with invalid connection requests.
2.3 Classification of DoS Attacks
Before discussing details of specific examples of DoS attacks, it is useful to classify
DoS attacks according to their characteristics. Some researchers have undertaken this
work in distinct ways. Readers can refer to [39, 34, 67] for more information. Here, we
provide two kinds of classification.
1. One possible classification of DoS attacks according to the aims of attacks could be:
• System destruction: The target of this type of attack is the hardware of net-
work devices, such as electricity power, network lines, and so on. These attacks
are easy to detect, and can be solved quickly by switching on the backup power
system, or recovering the communication lines. Besides these physical attacks,
the limitations of hardware, such as a Network card or CPU with too small
capability, is also an attack point in this category.
• Implementation bugs: Sometimes attackers may search for specific bugs in net-
work systems, or scan improper configurations of firewalls or routers to launch
their attacks. These system and application faults may be caused by the ig-
norance of administrators, or software bugs. The general solution is to install
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patches timely, and examine important input and output data for network de-
vices regularly and patiently.
• Resource consumption: A service provided by a server can be viewed as a
shared resource in the Internet. A DoS attacker who aims at resource consump-
tion can exploit bogus requests to deceive the victim server into repeatedly grant-
ing the resources to him, until it is exhausted or unavailable for other legitimate
clients. This type of attack is more difficult to tackle, because most of them
make use of the weaknesses of existing network protocols. In fact, their malicious
requests appear no different from legitimate ones, and ordinary defence systems
are incapable of detecting them.
According to the definition of resource, forms of attack can be further divided
into distinct parts as follows:
– System resource: This includes CPU processing capability, storage capa-
bility, buffer space, etc. Attackers cripple a victim by forcing it to process
more than it can handle. Notice that this result is not due to the low ca-
pability of the hardware. In fact, attackers take advantage of the flaws of
several protocols to unlimitedly amplify the effect of DoS attacks. As we
discuss later, TCP SYN flooding attacks belong just to this category.
– Bandwidth: When installing a network device, such as a server, a router
or a firewall, the administrator will configure the maximum bandwidth or
maximum connectivity. The aim of these attackers is to force a server to
deplete its connectivity or obstruct the network by flooding large amounts
of traffic packets. A Smurf attack forces routers to stop forwarding packets
due to network congestion.
2. The other classification relies on the evolution of DoS attacks, and three attack
modes can be identified:
• Single-to-Single: Early DoS attacks, such as IP Spoofing attacks and TCP SYN
flooding attacks, belong to this category. They exploit spoofed IP addresses to
cheat a victim server out of resources. But actually, they only use their own
system resources to perform these attacks. As a result, the power and impact
of these attacks are relatively impotent. Furthermore, they are less available to
launch attacks that aim at bandwidth consumption.
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• Multiple-to-Single: Early Distributed DoS attacks take advantage of network
worms to compromise vulnerable machines on the Internet. These raw recruits
are used to launch a cooperative DoS attack. In combination with the attack
methods used in Single-to-Single, many systems with less resources can attack a
much larger system.
• Multiple-to-Multiple: Nowadays, more sophisticated DDoS attacks can easily
overwhelm a target network that may include several network servers. Although
several countermeasures and DoS Detect systems have been applied to mitigate
the force of large-scale DDoS attacks, the data on DoS attacks each week indicate
that they are still far from being prevented.
The following table summarises the above classifications:
DoS Classification



by Aims:
by Modes:



(1). Physical destruction
(2). Implementation Bugs
(3). Resource consumption



(1). Single-to-Single
(2). Multiple-to-Single
(3). Multiple-to-Multiple
Table 2.1: DoS Classifications
2.4 Representative DoS Attacks
2.4.1 IP Spoofing
IP spoofing means to cheat others by using false IP addresses instead of one’s own.
Strictly speaking, IP Spoofing alone is not a DoS attack, but an important step in
those attacks. Nearly all successful DoS attacks need to cooperate with this technique
in order to conceal attackers’ real IP addresses and avoid IP tracing.
At the beginning, IP spoofing was used by attackers to gain unauthorized access
to remote systems. In 1995, one year before the appearance of SYN flooding attacks,
CERT reported several IP spoofing attacks [62], in which attackers could obtain root
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access to victim systems by making use of applications that used authentication based
on IP addresses.
When a client wants to establish a TCP connection, a program can be used to
generate a socket, automatically filling the header field of an IP packet with the source
address. However, an attacker may modify this program under Unix, and change the
address to whatever he wants. Due to the fact that the routing strategy only considers
IP destination addresses, the correctness of IP source addresses is unfortunately ignored
[30].
In some cases, an attacker can use IP spoofing to launch a small-scale DoS attack, as
in the following scenario, albeit that the strength of this attack is limited. An attacker
A forges B’s IP source address and sends a lot of packets to different destinations. As
a rule, all the returning IP packets flow to B, which may lead to network congestion.
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Figure 2.1: IP Spoofing Attack
2.4.2 TCP SYN Flooding
Taking advantage of the imperfections of the TCP connection establishment protocol
[33], attackers launch TCP SYN flooding attacks by flooding a target server with
many “half-open” connections, which leads to the victim’s connection capability being
depleted, so that it becomes unavailable for other legitimate clients.
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Normally, establishment of a TCP connection requires that both sides communicate:
a client and a server exchange an orderly sequence of messages [59]. This process
is commonly called TCP’s three-way handshake. The client begins this protocol by
sending a SYN message to the server, which is listening to connection requests from the
network. Acknowledging the SYN message, the server returns a SYN-ACK message to
the client, and meanwhile prepares for this connection by distributing a piece of buffer
space to store session information. The client completes the protocol by replying to an
ACK message. Now, the connection is established, and the service-specific data can
be transferred between the client and the server. Fig (2.2) illustrates this three-way
handshake connection.
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Figure 2.2: TCP’s Three-way Handshake
There are at least two shortcomings in this TCP connection establishment protocol.
One is that the authentication is based on source IP addresses, whereby an attacker
may perform IP spoofing. The other is located at the second step of the three-way
handshake, where, before receiving the final ACK message, the server has already
allocated buffer space for this connection, and must keep it until a timeout. Taking
advantage of this point, an attacker can exhaust the buffer space of the target server
by sending a sufficient number of “half-open” connections.
In this attack, the attacker uses IP spoofing to forge large amounts of initial con-
nection requests (SYN messages), and mount them to a target server. These requests
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appear to be legitimate and are not filtered by firewall or other defence systems. The
server responds with SYN-ACK messages, and allocates buffer space for each connec-
tion. Although the time for keeping these reserved buffer space is short, the space
can eventually be exhausted, and the server then fails to respond to other legitimate
clients, as long as the attacker floods numerous connection requests repeatedly. This
attack effectively prohibits normal clients from visiting the target server. That is the
reason for its prevalence in the hackers’ community.
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Figure 2.3: TCP SYN Flooding Attack
According to the advisory of CERT [59], any system connected to the Internet
and providing a TCP-based network service (such as Web Server, FTP server, or mail
server) is potentially vulnerable to this kind of attack.
2.4.3 Smurf
Smurf attacks make use of forged ICMP echo request packets and IP broadcast ad-
dresses to overwhelm a victim system with large amounts of ICMP echo reply packets
that are sent from an intermediary site [61].
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is used to inspect errors and send
control messages. It is also used to check whether a network device is responding.
Hence, if a machine receives an ICMP echo request packet, it will respond with an
ICMP echo reply packet.
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On the Internet, a packet can be transferred to an individual IP address or broadcast
to an entire subnet, depending on whether the destination address is an IP broadcast
address1. Via an IP broadcast address, a packet can be delivered to all machines on
that subnet.
In a typical Smurf attack, three parties play different roles: an attacker, an interme-
diary and a victim. Using IP spoofing, the attacker forges an ICMP echo request packet
with the victim’s source address, and sends it to an IP broadcast address. When all
the machines in the intermediary’s network receive this packet, they send ICMP echo
reply packets directly to the spoofed IP address, which actually belongs to the victim.
This may cause severe network congestion in the victim’s local network. The targets of
this attack may include not only the victim host, but also routers and communication
lines connected to the victim’s local network. The function of the intermediary site is
to amplify the amount of traffic that flows to the victim’s address. In consequence,
some researchers refer to this site as an amplifier site [34].
Tools for launching this type of DoS attack have been developed [61], which can
spread these attacks to multiple intermediaries simultaneously, and lead to much larger
attacks. In other cases, the target of Smurf attacks can be the intermediary directly.
If all the machines on that network respond to one or several ICMP echo requests, it
will certainly cause severe network congestion and outage. In particular, if an attacker
can force routers to stop forwarding packets, then all the hosts behind those routers
are effectively disconnected.
2.4.4 DDoS
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a new form of DoS attack, first reported in
early 2000 [16, 54, 66]. In contrast to traditional DoS attacks, DDoS attackers, in
particular, are armed with self-propagation worms which can be installed on a discre-
tionary number of vulnerable computers on the Internet. An attacker is able to harness
these compromised machines in order to mount a coordinated DoS attack. These in-
fected machines are typically divided into two groups: “Masters” and “Zombies”, which
play different roles in a DDoS attack. “Masters” are more like an intermediary, while
“Zombies” serve as attack platforms. Communication between an attacker and the
“Zombies” is not direct, but depends on the “Masters”. One “Master” may control
and deliver the attacker’s command to a number of “Zombies”. By mounting such a
1Each LAN (Local-area Network) on the Internet possess an IP broadcast address.
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Figure 2.4: Smurf Attack
coordinated DoS attack, the effectiveness of a DDoS can be multiplied by 10, 100, or
even 10,000 times [24].
A typical DDoS attack process can be described as follows. An attacker first scans
a large range of networks to find vulnerable hosts that have weak defences against a
malicious intrusion. The number of these hosts is determined by the strength of the
attack that an attacker intends to launch. Second, the attacker installs “Master” or
“Agent” programs on these vulnerable hosts. A machine with an “Agent” program is
called a “Zombie”, which carries out the actual attack. A machine installed with a
“Master” program is able to communicate with a number of “Zombies” and serves as a
control-handler of the attacker. An attacker can command several “Masters” directly,
and “Zombies” are activated by these “Masters” at the designated time for an attack.
Fig (2.5) shows this three-layer control. The reason for using such an architecture is
to keep the attacker safe and difficult to trace. Now, all the preparation has been
accomplished. The attacker only needs to cross his fingers and wait for an appropriate
time to launch his DDoS attack. When a defending server suspects that it is under
a DoS attack, it can only find numerous legitimate connection requests received from
a large number of legitimate IP addresses, consuming all the resources of the server.
However, the real owners of these “Zombies” are unwitting accomplices [34], and do
not know what has actually happened on their machines.
The improvements in DDoS attacks can be summarised as having two main features.
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Figure 2.5: Three-layer Control For A DDoS Attack
One is that DDoS attacks may effectively bypass IP spoofing defence mechanisms.
Before 2000, researchers exploited ingress/egress filtering edge routers to stop most
packets with spoofed IP addresses. This forced the attacker to perform IP spoofing
by using only the addresses from his own network. A simple and powerful solution
against these attacks is to filter all packets from one suspected network in order to
ensure service for legitimate clients from the rest of the Internet. Unfortunately, DDoS
attacks can pass around this filter by launching attacks from different networks. It
would be pointless for a network service provider to block all request packets from so
many networks.
The other characteristic is that a DDoS attacker can amplify attack traffic im-
mensely by using self-propagation worms to compromise sufficient computers on the
Internet. He can manually or automatically scan the Internet to find each vulnerable
machine on N networks as his “Zombie”. One “Zombie” issues 1/N traffic load to a
target server. If N is big enough, it may bring down any target and cause an incredible
amount of damage.
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DDoS Tools and Technologies
Usually, attackers utilise professional tools to launch attacks. Sub7, TFN, Trin00 and
“Stacheldraht” are earlier DDoS tools, whilst Kaiten, GTbot, sdbot appear to be more
recent [34]. Nearly all DDoS tools, however, need some core techniques to accomplish
attacks, such as scanning, propagation, and communication. These techniques are
usually exploited before real attacks start, but serve as vital points in DDoS attacks.
In the following section, we will describe these methods. It is beneficial for readers to
comprehend how attackers recruit and control their “Masters” and “Zombies”:
(1) Scanning
Scanning is the first step in launching DDoS attacks. What attackers scan for are
vulnerable machines/systems existing within the entire Internet. “Vulnerable”, in
this context, means that these machines/systems are subject to intrusion attacks,
since most of them have weak or even no defence systems, such as firewall or anti-
virus software. Some of them may have a number of system bugs (for example,
bugs reported in Microsoft Windows systems or Internet Explorer), and have not
been fixed in time. All of them offer the opportunity for attacks to intrude these
machines/systems and leave unnoticeable codes for malicious intentions. In early
DDoS attacks, an attacker had to personally scan and identify all the potential
targets he/she required, storing their addresses into a list. This list was used to
direct compromised machines to recruit more “Masters” and “Zombies”. More
recently, this situation has been changed by network worms like Code Red, which
can fulfill the process of scanning-detection-infection-propagation automatically,
without any direction from attackers [63].
A scanning strategy is a method for selecting the next machine to be probed.
A primitive type is random scanning strategy, in which compromised machines
probe random IP address for potential targets. Sometimes this technique can
lead to network congestion, since many machines may detect, and try to intrude,
the same IP address simultaneously. Hitlist scanning can avoid this problem
by recording all the machines that have been detected and compromised. This
technique is utilised to speed up the initial slow phase of worm propagation. More
details and other scanning strategies can be found in [39, 63].
(2) Propagation
Today, automated propagation has been developed into three general models [14]:
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the central source propagation, the back-chaining model and the autonomous
model. In central source propagation, the attack code is stored in a central
server or set of servers. A propagation is fulfilled by an intrusion transferring a
copy of the attack code from the central source to a newly compromised system.
During back-chaining propagation, a system which is intended to compromise
other potential targets, serves as a central source from which the attack code
can be delivered to others. The newly infected machines then become the source
for the next propagation [39]. In contrast with the central source propagation,
this model ensures a smooth delivery for the attack code. Autonomous prop-
agation can directly inject a vulnerable machine with the attack code, without
downloading or copying it from a external source, saving the file retrieval phase.
(3) Communication
Communication mechanisms are another important issue not only for DDoS at-
tackers, but also for security engineers. If communication packets from an at-
tacker to “Masters”, or from “Masters” to “Zombies”, can be detected ahead
of real attacks, according to the destinations of these packets, the compromised
machines can be identified and removed easily. However, as time goes by, com-
munication channels for DDoS attacks are becoming more difficult to detect.
Early DDoS tools used TCP/UDP packets for communication, which are rela-
tively easy to identify using network monitoring tools, such as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS). Then attackers found the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) provides a
sufficiently anonymous environment for communicating with “Zombies” directly,
which makes it more difficult to identify DDoS networks [14].
Attack Network Topologies
There are two major topologies in DDoS attacks: direct attacks and reflection attacks.
The architecture of direct attacks has been demonstrated in Fig (2.5). An attacker
controls several “Masters” that are responsible for transmitting the attack command to
a number of “Zombies”. At a designated time, all the “Zombies” launch a direct DDoS
attack by flooding a victim with numerous bogus requests. The attack command flows
along the following path:
Attacker → Masters → Zombies → Victim
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The architecture of a reflection DDoS attack is illustrated in Fig (2.6). Denote
network (a), which consists of all the “Masters” and “Zombies”, as the attack network.
Network (b) represents a large number of well-meaning and innocent servers, which
unfortunately act as reflectors in a reflection DDoS attack. Many of these reflectors
possess broadband or good connectivity, such as Internet server providers, TCP servers,
and so on. In this kind of attack, by manipulating attack network (a), an attacker can
mount many initial requests carrying a target’s IP address to innocent systems in
network (b). These systems will unwittingly reply and return corresponding messages
to the victim, which can easily exhaust the victim’s bandwidth and lead to severe
network congestion. In reflection DDoS attacks, it is more difficult to detect malicious
packets on the Internet, and much harder to find clues to the attack network or the
attackers’ real IP addresses.
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Figure 2.6: Reflection DDoS Attack
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2.5 Proposed Countermeasures
To prevent DoS attacks, many defence mechanisms have been proposed. Various fire-
walls and router configurations have been suggested by network administrators and
commercial vendors. Protocol designers are also trying to improve existing protocols
to make them resistant to DoS attacks. However, most of them inevitably have poten-
tial disadvantages, and are not capable of successfully defending against DoS/DDoS
attacks.
Before introducing several proposed countermeasures, we look briefly at the differ-
ences between the Internet and the traditional phone network2, which does not often
suffer from malicious denial of service attacks inside [15]. There are three reasons for
this. First, every connection request (call) binds tightly with its real address (phone
number). It is fairly easy to identify an attacker. Second, it seems impossible in the
phone network where an attacker exploits worms/viruses to compromise other tele-
phones for a cooperated DoS attack. The last reason is that a DoS attack launched via
the traditional phone network requires a lot of resources, including human resources,
money and time.
According to these reasons, scientists and researchers strive to find similar ways
to resolve DoS problems. Ingress/Egress filtering and packet marking can be used to
obtain a relatively reliable IP address. Client puzzles are deployed to increase the cost
of launching DoS attacks. A number of anti-virus softwares and intrusion detection
systems have been developed to detect and stop the spread of network worms.
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to current defence methods. More in-
formation can be obtained from the following literature: Trackback IP [44, 42], Ingress
/egress filtering [25, 43], SYN cookies [8, 11], Client Puzzle [5, 6, 15, 33], and Operating
system improvement [13, 49].
2.5.1 Ingress/Egress Filtering
The aim of filtering is to stop packets with spoofed IP addresses from reaching a target
server. To date, two primary methods have been studied: ingress filtering and egress
filtering [67].
2Internet phone services may attract DoS attacks toward the traditional phone network, by ex-
ploiting software (such as Skype, Net2Phone, etc) to generate enough call requests to block a call
centre. However, in this thesis, we treat Internet telephony as an extended application of the Internet
and as such is vulnerable. As a result, we believe that if DoS attacks can be solved for the Internet,
the possibility of the traditional phone network being attacked by Internet telephony will decrease.
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Ingress filtering is applied on the external interface of a network (e.g. firewall/routers)
and drops all suspected incoming packets. For example, if the source address of an in-
coming packet belongs to its internal network, this packet will be dropped immediately.
This scenario is illustrated in Fig (2.7), where three packets from distinct IP addresses
try to pass into a subnet, and the firewall filters unwanted packets according to the
ingress filtering rule.
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Figure 2.7: Ingress Filtering
In contrast, egress filtering is exploited on the internal interface of a network to
inspect packets going out. It will filter the packets that do not have the local network
addresses.
• Advantage: The packets filtering mechanism is an efficient way to prevent most
spoofed packets from travelling on the Internet. Although an attacker can still
perform IP spoofing by using his/her local network addresses, it is relatively easy
for victim servers to trace back and identify the deployed network, then tackle it
with corresponding security measures.
• Disadvantage: As mentioned in Section 2.4, IP spoofing may help attackers hide
their real identities, which, as a result, becomes an important step in launching
a DoS/DDoS attack. However, DDoS attacks, in particular, are often launched
from real IP addresses (“Zombies” and “Master”). Ingress/Egress filtering do
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not work well in these DDoS attack scenarios. Moreover, to efficiently prevent
spoofed packets, filtering mechanisms must be applied widely on network routers
and firewalls within the whole Internet, which would be not easy to reach in to-
day’s Internet, where fills in numerous different network devices based on various
network protocols and industry standards.
2.5.2 Packet Marking
Packet marking is also used to prevent IP spoofing. In this method, a packet can be
traced back to its source address by inserting traceback data into the packet when it
passes through distinct routers to the destination [42, 44]. If a victim is attacked, it can
deduce the path of malicious packets in order to identify the attacker’s source address.
• Advantage: This may be combined with filtering mechanisms to destroy IP
spoofing completely. Packet marking is capable of meeting the demands of DDoS
defence.
• Disadvantage: Requiring each router to insert unique information as a packet
passes will increase traffic load and create much information redundancy. More-
over, since the traceback data needs to be encoded, packet marking encounters
computational difficulties when it has to deal with a large number of attack
packets [67].
2.5.3 Time-out
In the time-out approach, a server deploys a short period of time to wait for the final
ACK message, which should be returned from a client to complete TCP connection
protocol. After this time, which we call “time-out”, the connection request will be
rejected. Meanwhile, the distributed buffer space for this connection will also be cleared
[33].
• Advantage: This approach may help the server to prevent too many half-open
SYN packets from being crammed into the buffer space. It is easy to implement
in existing servers, without any need to increase software/hardware, or modify
network protocols.
• Disadvantage: This approach can be overwhelmed by a SYN flooding attack
with a high-speed rate, which means the buffer space may be filled with malicious
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connection requests before each time-out occurs. Furthermore, a short time-out
can possibly influence the service availability of clients whose network connection
has a long time delay.
2.5.4 Random Dropping
In the random dropping approach, a server selects a certain percentage for its buffer
capacity, which should never be 100 percent. When the amount of consumed buffer
space reaches this designated value, a number of half-open connection requests in the
waiting queue will be rejected at random.
• Advantage: Using this approach, a server is able to avoid a complete denial of
service, since the server buffer will never be consumed completely. The server
only needs a random dropping algorithm to perform this approach.
• Disadvantage: No identification for random dropping may result in a substan-
tially degraded service for legitimate clients. It is a undesirable consequence,
especially when most requests waiting in queue belong to a DoS attacker.
2.5.5 SYN Cookies
Since TCP SYN flooding attacks exploit the inherent shortcomings of the protocol, it
appears reasonable to improve the protocol to resist attacks. SYN cookies belong to
this category.
In the SYN cookies approach, a server verifies the authentication of connection
requests by using so-called “cookies”, which are computed by hashing a series of con-
nection parameters. These parameters include a client’s IP address, port number, and
a secret number known only by the server. When receiving a client request i, the server
generates a secret number, and hashes connection parameters to obtain a “cookie” Hi.
The server then returns a SYN-ACK message containing Hi to the client. Until the
server receives the final ACK message with the correct Hi, the resource will not be
allocated for this formal connection [33].
• Advantage: SYN cookies are believed to be one of the most successful defences
against TCP SYN flooding. Instead of allocating resources without any verifica-
tion, SYN cookies introduce a small authentication mechanism to help the server
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distinguish between spoofed IP addresses and legitimate ones. Resources are only
granted to the client who can successfully pass the authentication.
• Disadvantage: The major limitation of this approach is that SYN cookies as-
sume that IP spoofing attackers are incapable of eavesdropping on the SYN-ACK
messages sent to the spoofed IP address, and consequently, attackers cannot pro-
vide the server with the correct cookies. This assumption may not be always
correct. For example, if spoofed IP addresses are located within the same sub-
net, it is relatively easy for an attacker to intercept all the packets transferred on
the network.
On the other hand, the cryptographic hashing used in SYN cookies is quite ex-
pensive. Some engineers argue therefore, that servers expecting a lot of incoming
connections should not use this solution.
2.6 Summary
Since 2000, the more serious impact of DoS attacks on the Internet has caused pub-
lic suspicion about the Internet as a feasible tool for electronic commerce and other
electronic businesses. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, few proposed defence sys-
tems have been found capable of protecting both network servers and legitimate clients
against DoS attacks. The situation seems hopeless, but it may be saved by the magic
of client puzzles, which need not sacrifice any legitimate clients to the server’s interests
(as Random Dropping does), they do not lead to a heavy traffic load on the Internet (as
Packet Marking does), and they can even be based on a stronger assumption than SYN
cookies. Client puzzles are the major theme of this thesis, and they will be elaborated
on from the following chapter.
Chapter 3
Client Puzzles
Client puzzles are proposed as a promising countermeasure against DoS attacks. Since
these attacks mostly exploit defects in existing network protocols, the advantage of
client puzzles over other proposed methods is that by improving protocols directly, it
is feasible to confine DoS attacks in a harmless range for defending servers. This chapter
begins with an overview of client puzzles, in which several features of client puzzles will
be addressed. In addition, the idea of client puzzles deduces from cryptographic puzzles
that were first used in key agreement [38]. To assist readers with a comprehensive
knowledge of cryptographic puzzles, their two applications in relevant security fields
will be introduced. Then, the Client Puzzle Protocol proposed by Juels and Brainard
[33], which is designed as a work platform for client puzzles, will be examined. As
how to construct proper puzzles for DoS defence is the key issue of client puzzles, two
proposed puzzle constructions will be described at the end of the chapter. Meanwhile,
their weaknesses are analysed in detail.
3.1 Overview of Client Puzzles
In a typical DoS attack, an adversary deploys unauthorised service requests to consume
the limited resources of a target server. The aim of client puzzles is to impose a
moderate authentication cost on each client wishing to obtain service from a defending
server. This can be achieved by asking clients to solve different cryptographic puzzles
(here we call them client puzzles). “Cost”, in this context, means computational cost,
such as CPU processing time and memory space. Recent studies show that existing
DDoS tools are designed carefully not so as to disturb “Zombie” computers, and thus
avoid alerting their real owners. In other words, “Zombies” are unable to furtively
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compute puzzles for the adversary. In this way, the defending server may force the
adversary to give up, because applying for more resources demands that the adversary
invest more resources himself/herself.
A client puzzle is a moderately difficult cryptographic problem. Unlike conventional
public-key authentication, creation and verification of these puzzles is much easier and
less expensive, which can satisfy the demands of dealing with large amounts of incom-
ing requests. The cost of computing client puzzles is negligible for legitimate clients,
but unendurably expensive for DoS attackers, who attempt to acquire considerable
resources from the server.
Client puzzles need a work platform to fulfill their promise. In 1999, Juels and
Brainard successfully proposed a client puzzle protocol to defend against TCP SYN
flooding attacks. The idea of the client puzzle protocol is very simple [33]. When
there is no evidence of attack, a server accepts connection requests normally. If the
defending server comes under a DoS attack, it distributes a unique client puzzle to each
client who is applying for a connection. In order to obtain the server’s resources for
his/her connection, a client must compute the puzzle correctly, and return the solution
in time. This protocol is deployed in conjunction with the traditional time-out, which
is used to control the time period for puzzle computation. Consequently, it is hard for
an adversary to compute large numbers of puzzles in a short period, which can be used
to differentiate legitimate requests from malicious half-open ones.
The client puzzle protocol has several advantages over other defences. First, it
improves defects in existing network protocols, and does not increase packet load on
the Internet. Second, this protocol is working within a stronger attack model than
standard measures [33]. For example, SYN cookies are based on the assumption that
an attacker is incapable of intercepting messages sent to spoofed IP addresses. We
know that this assumption is not always correct. Third, when dealing with high-speed
requests, the client puzzle protocol filters malicious ones more effectively than random
dropping. The difficulty of client puzzles can be adjusted flexibly to adapt to different
strengths of attacks. The last is that the client puzzle protocol can either work as
an independent protocol in the application layer, or can be built into other service
protocols it attempts to defend, such as TCP/IP, TLS [21], and so on.
On the other hand, client puzzles have one inadequacy. A client who requests a
service from a defending server has to install a small client-side program for the com-
putation of puzzles. Most of the other countermeasures against DoS attacks, such as
Traceback IP, SYN cookies, and Ingress/Egress filtering methods, merely demand a
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modification to a defending server or a fundamental network protocol, although the
potential disadvantages of these approaches are inevitable, as outlined in Chapter 2.
Compared with these, client puzzles are able to ensure service quality and protect
servers against DoS attacks effectively, as long as clients install a puzzle-solving soft-
ware. In today’s network technology, such software can easily be implemented by a
plug-in of a web browser, or distributed by the servers. Hence, the requirements for
this special software should not be a problem.
3.2 Application of Puzzles
Client puzzles are viewed as special cryptographic problems. In fact, any cryptographic
problem can be a puzzle. But not all of them can be client puzzles. Cryptographic
puzzles have been applied in a wide range of security fields, such as defending against
junk e-mail [22] and metering Web site usage [26]. In this section, we shall address two
of these applications in security fields to help readers gain a comprehensive knowledge
of puzzles.
3.2.1 Puzzles in Key Agreement
Cryptographic puzzle is an old technique, which was first exploited by Ralph C. Merkle
[38] to solve the problem of secret key exchange. In the context of public key cryptog-
raphy, Merkle raised the possibility of transmitting a secret key in insecure communi-
cation channels.
Informally, the method can be simply described as follows: A and B want to com-
municate over an insecure channel, and C has the ability to eavesdrop on all the infor-
mation transmitted between A and B. Assume that C can neither forge messages, nor
interrupt the communication. In addition, C is hard to predict the new information
generated by either A or B.
A generates a puzzle set which contains n cryptographic puzzles. This set is then
sent to B who randomly picks up one puzzle from the set, and solves it. Both A
and B now possess a common piece of information – the solution to the puzzle that
B solved. They will refer to this solution as the secret key for their further privacy.
We assume that one unit of computational cost generates each puzzle, and n units of
computational cost solve each puzzle. This implies that both A and B have invested
n units of effort. However, the eavesdropper C is unable to find out which puzzle B
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selected. In consequence, C must consume n units of effort to solve each of n puzzles,
for a total of n2 units of effort.
According to Merkle’s method, an adversary is forced to expend an amount of
computational overhead which increases as the square of the effort needed by the two
communicants for selecting a key.
3.2.2 Puzzles in Junk Mail Defence
Due to the ease and low cost of sending electronic mails, and particularly the simplicity
of broadcasting the same message to a group, junk mail has becomes a practical threat
on the Internet. People feel frustrated and helpless when they encounter the same
situation every day: hundreds of meaningless mails in their e-mail boxes. In a worst-
case scenario, an adversary can easily render an arbitrary e-mail address incapable of
accepting other mails, by flooding numerous junk mails to exhaust its capacity.
In 1992, Dwork and Naor introduced cryptographic puzzles into junk mail defence
[22], in which the mail system requires a sender to pay a moderate cost for each message.
The cost can be defined as a hardware/software resource consumed for computing a
cryptographic puzzle, and it is trivial for legitimate clients, but expensive for a junk
mail sender. This was the first time that cryptographic puzzles were incorporated into
access control.
Besides proposing a framework of defence systems, the most valuable contribution
of their paper is to describe the definition and properties of a “puzzle” f [22]:
1. f is moderately easy to compute for clients.
2. f is not amenable to amortisation: given l values m1, ..., ml, the amortised cost of
computing f(m1), ..., f(ml) is comparable to computing f(mi) for any 1 ≤ l ≤ l.
3. given x and y, it is easy to determine if y = f(x) for mail servers.
Note that the second point provides a definition for the hardness of computing a
puzzle which can be used to distinguish degrees of computation difficulty. According
to this definition, a puzzle may be chosen to act as a trapdoor algorithm [51]: given
some additional information (the trapdoor), the computation would be considerably
less expensive. It is convenient for puzzle distributors to verify the answers later.
Dwork and Naor also presented several puzzle constructions to support their system.
Among these, the hash function is extended respectively by Juels [33] and Aura [5] in
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their papers.
3.3 Client Puzzle Protocol
To defeat TCP SYN flooding attacks, Juels and Brainard [33] proposed a new scheme
to remedy the flaws in the TCP connection establishment protocol. This is the client
puzzle protocol, which is referred to as a fundamental infrastructure of client puzzles.
Nearly all relevant research on client puzzles (including ours) is based on it. This section
will introduce the specifications of this protocol, along with its work environment.
Juels and Brainard designed an attack model in which the client puzzle protocol
might work effectively. They first assumed that an attacker A attempts to make use
of a client/server protocol M so as to deplete either the memory or computational
resources of a target server S. Meanwhile, a number of legitimate clients {Ci} exist
in the same network, and may ask for service from S. They then addressed several
assumptions to define the capability and incapability of A. We explain and discuss
three of the major assumptions in the following section.
(1) A cannot modify packets sent from any Ci to S.
If this assumption does not hold, then any adversaries who are able to modify
packets arbitrarily can launch a DoS attack simply by changing the source ad-
dresses of all packets sent to the server. By doing this, no legitimate client can
obtain a response from the server, because all messages that have been replied
will be sent to false addresses. Hence, the attackers do not need to mount re-
source depletion attacks, and can easily defeat the server. On the other hand, it is
possible that a limited number of clients’ packets may be modified by adversaries
on the Internet. But, so long as it is not on a large scale, this protocol can still
protect the servers against DoS attacks.
(2) A cannot significantly delay packets sent from any Ci to S.
Similarly, if any attackers can delay packets transferred on the Internet for a long
while, it is equivalent to interrupting the communication line. Attackers do not
need to launch any resource depletion attacks, and can easily achieve the goal of
denial of service.
(3) A can read any messages sent to any IP address.
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In fact, we do not completely agree with this assumption. Since a packet may be
sent to a large number of different networks, it is hard for attackers to eavesdrop
on each of them. This assumption, in fact, makes the SYN cookies method totally
pointless. Currently, however it is still a practical and easy security measure
against DoS attacks for many websites. Hence, in our solution, we consider that
some of packets can be eavesdropped, rather than all.
Juels and Brainard tried to use the client puzzle protocol to defend an arbitrary
protocol M (such as TCP or SSL) against DoS attacks. As mentioned above, this
new protocol can be layered either independently on top of the protocol M , or can be
embedded directly into M . In their paper, they chose the former.
The client puzzle protocol can be illustrated in Fig (3.1) and Fig (3.2). To simplify
the description, we assume that the protocol M is initiated by clients, such that the
first message in the protocol M is sent from the client Ci to the server S. Hence, Ci
first sends a service request message to S, along with a query about whether S is under
an attack. If there is no such a threat, S replies with the answer “No”, and allocates
memory space to continue the remaining part of the protocol M as indicated in Fig
(3.1).
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Figure 3.1: No DoS Attack Threat
If its memory usage is beyond a designated percentage, the server S may suspect
that it is suffering a DoS attack. In this case, the message return to the query includes
3.4. Puzzle Construction 33
the answer “Yes”, a client puzzle and a timestamp t. Ci must resolve the puzzle
correctly, and return its solution within a time period Td = T − t, in which T is the
current time, and Td is designed by the server administrator. When S receives the
solution, it first checks whether the solution has expired, then verifies its correctness.
Only the request which belongs to the client who correctly solves the puzzle can be
granted to the server’s resources and continue the protocol M . In addition, the time for
using the allocated memory for each connection is limited by Tc. After this time, the
connection is disrupted by S, and Ci has to make another request for a new connection.
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Figure 3.2: Under A DoS Attack
Juels and Brainard also presented a simple design for the puzzle, which is based
mainly on a non-invertible hash function. However, in their paper, the puzzle scheme
they have proposed has some unresolved problems (such as redundancy and solution
collision), and needs to be improved further.
3.4 Puzzle Construction
Although the depth of research has been enhanced, and client puzzles are showing
promise against DoS attacks, they still face many challenges. For instance, one of the
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key issues is how to build up puzzles that are qualified to satisfy the requirements
for handling large amounts of suspicious service requests. To date, researchers have
proposed several puzzle construction schemes, such as the hash function based puzzles
[15, 21, 33], the Diffie-Hellman based puzzles [6], the game theory based client puzzles
[7], and so on. Most of them, however have underlying weaknesses that may be captured
by attackers and lead to DoS attacks. In this section, we shall describe two proposed
client puzzle schemes, and try to analyse their inherent problems. Following these
discussions, we shall present our solutions and new schemes in later chapters.
3.4.1 Hash Function-based Puzzle Scheme
Compared with the scheme proposed by Juels and Brainard, Aura and Nikander later
presented a more convincing specification of one-way hash function for client puzzles
[5], in which a defending server sends a puzzle’s parameters to a client, and according to
these parameters, the client performs a brute-force search to find the correct solution.
The difficulty of this puzzle can be adjusted by varying the puzzle’s parameters. The
server commits its resources to the client only after the solution is verified.
The hash function can be demonstrated as shown in the following table [5].
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Figure 3.3: Aura’s Client Puzzle Construction
To construct new puzzles, the server generates a random number NS periodically,
and sends it to its clients. The valid time for NS should be short (such as 60 seconds)
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in order to prevent attackers from precomputing solutions. The server also decides the
difficulty level k of the puzzle. Now, NS and k together form the puzzle that is sent to
clients.
To solve the puzzle, the client also needs a random number NC , the main purpose of
which is to reuse the server NS for new puzzles. According to the parameters received
from the server and NC and C, the client performs a brute-force search to find the
solution X, which should ensure the first k bits of the hash value are all zero.
The advantages of this puzzle scheme are enumerated as follows:
(1) Before the server verifies the solutions, no memory space needs to be distributed
to clients. The server only generates one random number NS to create new
puzzles.
(2) The only efficient way to solve the puzzle is to try every possible X until a solution
is found. The cost of solving a puzzle relies on the value of k, which can easily
be controlled by the server.
(3) The solutions are hard to precompute because of the short valid time for one
single NS.
On the other hand, we have also found some shortcomings in this scheme:
(a) The server has to keep a record of the used NS in order to prevent attackers from
reusing them and precomputing solutions. Furthermore, due to the randomness
of NS, the server has to check that a certain NS has not been calculated before,
which wastes processing time.
(b) Although the difficulty level k can easily be adjusted by the server, the compu-
tation cost for clients is relatively hard to predict, and the waiting time for the
solution is similarly unknown.
(c) The vital weakness of this scheme is located at the verification phase. To verify
the solution of a puzzle, the server first has to check that NS is valid, and that C,
NC , and NS have not been used together before. After that, the server performs
a similar cryptographic hash computation as the client did, to check whether the
solution is correct. This opens up the opportunity for the puzzle verification to
become a target of DoS attacks, in which an adversary overwhelms the server
with numerous random solutions that the server has to process.
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3.4.2 Diffie-Hellman Based Puzzle Scheme
In 2004, Waters and Juels [6] proposed a fresh puzzle scheme, which is based on the
Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and permits the outsourcing of puzzles. To eliminate
puzzle construction as a target of DoS attacks, an external service (which they call
a “bastion”) is introduced in their paper to help multiple servers distribute puzzles.
Interestingly, many servers can rely on the same bastion, while the bastion need not
know which servers are deploying its service.
Puzzle distribution using this approach depends, in particular, on virtual channels,
rather than per-request or per-session as in previous schemes. A web server may limit
the maximum number of open TCP connections per channel in order to control accepted
communication via a restricted collection of channels, when it encounters a DoS attack.
At every time interval, the bastion generates client puzzles for distinct channels, which
are suitable for all servers that rely on the bastion’s service. Moreover, each server
has a unique identity, such as a public key. If a client intends to communicate with a
certain server, he/she needs to combine the corresponding public key with the puzzle
that he/she receives from the bastion, solving this reconstructed puzzle to obtain a
valid token for later connection. In other words, the puzzles distributed from a bastion
are general ones. Only in connection with the public key of a specific server, can the
client calculate a proper solution to meet the server’s demand.
According to Fig (3.4), the algorithm of the Diffie-Hellman based puzzle construc-
tion can be described as follows.
• To create a general puzzle for a certain channel c and a certain time period t,
the bastion selects a random integer rc,t ∈R Zq where q is a large prime. Then,
select a second random integer ac,t ∈R [rc,t , (rc,t + l) mod q], in which l is the
difficulty level of the puzzle. Let f ′ denote a one-way permutation on Zq, and g
be a published generator (order q), such that gc,t = g
f ′(ac,t). Hence, the bastion
publishes the puzzle Pc,t = {gc,t, rc,t}.
• Receiving the puzzle Pc,t, a client (or an attacker) has to perform a brute-force
testing for all the possible values in the search range, in order to find the exact a′
which can satisfy the equation: gc,t = g
f ′(a′). Then, for a specific server’s public
key YID, the solution to the puzzle is SID = Y
f ′(ac,t)
ID .
• Using its secret key XID as a shortcut, a defending server is able to compute
the solution in one step: SID = g
XID
c,t , which can be verified in the following
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equations. Since
YID = g
XID (mod q)
then,
SID = Y
f ′(ac,t)
ID
= g XID·f
′(ac,t)
= g f
′(ac,t)·XID
= g XIDc,t (mod q)
By comparing these two solutions, the server then determines whether to allocate
resources to the client.
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Figure 3.4: D-H-based Client Puzzle Construction
The main advantages of this puzzle scheme are enumerated as follows:
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(1) This method allows clients to solve puzzles offline. First, a client obtains a
general puzzle from a bastion, and solves it within the valid time. The client
then combines this solution with a server’s public key to compute the specific
solution to meet the server’s demand. All these computations can be achieved
offline, so that clients do not have to sit and wait while their computers solve
puzzles.
(2) The deployment of a bastion can mitigate the possibility of puzzle distribution
as a target point of DoS attacks.
(3) The deployment of virtual channels help the server detect DoS attacks and allo-
cate system resources rationally. By inspecting the usage of channels, the server
can determine whether it is under attack, and limit communication to a restricted
collection of channels.
Similarly, we have identified some problems in this scheme:
(a) We note that this scheme relies on virtual channels, where one channel owns only
one puzzle. Consequently, in a specified time period, there are only n puzzles for
the server (n is the number of valid channels). If an attacker can solve several
of them, he can easily exhaust the resources of the corresponding channels. Due
to the fact that there is no other identity for these solutions except the source
IP addresses, the server is obliged to stop all communication in these decayed
channels, and legitimate clients who solve the puzzles for these channels cannot
obtain a response.
(b) Furthermore, this scheme is vulnerable to attackers’ eavesdropping. If an attacker
is able to eavesdrop on packets sent from clients to the server, he/she may exploit
the solution computed by legitimate clients to deceive the server.
(c) Another practical problem is that all the servers that depend on the same bastion
have to have uniform configurations, such as the same number of channels, and
the same size of the timeslot. It is inflexible for web servers that possess distinct
resource and bandwidth capability.
(d) Finally, the cost of computing a puzzle solution on the server requires one modular
exponentiation, which is too expensive to be accepted in practice.
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3.5 Summary
This chapter has shown the robustness of client puzzles in DoS defence. Although it
has many advantages over other proposed measures, the puzzle mechanism still faces
many challenges. The most important issue is what an efficient puzzle construction
might look like. Many researchers have proposed puzzle schemes, but few of them
can satisfy the demands of both web servers and legitimate clients. In the following
chapters, we will propose one general model and two specific schemes to solve these
problems. The ideas are based mostly on conventional trapdoor algorithms and several
hard problems in mathematics, such as Factorisation and Logarithm Discrete.
Chapter 4
Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System
The preceding chapter introduced the idea of client puzzles, and analysed their po-
tential weaknesses by investigating some existing schemes. In this chapter, we shall
first discuss and summarise the problems that might introduce new possibilities for
DoS attacks against a defending server. After that, we shall advocate the essential
requirements that all promising puzzles should follow to overcome the disadvantages of
client puzzles. Based on these requirements, we shall propose a new model for puzzle
distribution, called a Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System (TCPS), which is expected
to mitigate the vulnerabilities of client puzzles. This chapter can be viewed as a pre-
liminary definition of the TCPS. In the following two chapters, we shall introduce two
modified families of trapdoor algorithms that can be used to fulfill puzzle construction.
4.1 Problems
Although the employment of client puzzles in DoS scenarios appears to be promising,
we have noted that there is some opposition, such as the idea expressed on some
websites [19, 48]. It is argued that the current techniques of client puzzles are not
necessarily better than SYN cookies because, as members of the cryptographic family,
most proposed puzzle schemes inevitably have two vital shortcomings.
First, the complexity of puzzle construction and verification might turn the client
puzzle mechanism itself into a victim of DoS attacks. For instance, client puzzles based
on Hash functions [5] require a defending server to calculate a hash function in order to
verify each answer received from clients. As a result, an attack scenario may occur in
which an adversary sends numerous bogus answers that the server has to process. An-
other more extreme example is where a Diffie-Hellman based construction [6] requires
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the server to perform a modular exponentiation for the solution of a puzzle, which
consumes more resources than hashing does. It is clear that the cost of verification
(for a defending server), being greater than that of generating random answers (for an
adversary), may result in DoS attacks. On the other hand, a complicated construction
also attracts attackers’ attention. A scenario of this type of attack would be where,
by utilising spoofed IP addresses, an adversary floods a defending server with false
connection requests to cheat the server exhausting the resources for the construction
of puzzles.
The second noticeable weakness in current schemes is that, to ensure the ran-
domness and non-iteration of client puzzles, the defending server has to store all the
correctly solved instances (for example, NS and NC) so that the solutions cannot be
reused by attackers [5, 33]. However, as time goes by, the memory space becomes con-
gested. Meanwhile, to guarantee the validity of puzzles and solutions, the defending
server has to perform two comparisons respectively in puzzle construction and verifi-
cation to examine whether the puzzles and solutions have been used before. This is
undesirable in a client puzzle mechanism.
4.2 Essential Requirements
To serve as a promising countermeasure against DoS attacks, client puzzles must always
satisfy the following essential requirements.
1. The computational cost of solving a puzzle on the client’s side should be always
higher than that of puzzle generation and verification on the server’s side.
Although legitimate clients will experience a slight delay in having their solution
verified, an adversary flooding a server with concurrent requests has to invest
larger amounts of computational resources. This increases the difficulties of such
an attack in practice.
2. The puzzles are stateless.
This means that a defending server must create puzzles randomly, and cannot
reveal any information regarding their generation, neither within the puzzle de-
scriptions nor their solutions. It means that knowing a number of the solutions
does not help a new client solve the puzzles. In consequence, puzzles are unpre-
dictable, and we cannot compute solutions in advance.
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3. The puzzles are easy to construct.
Generating a puzzle should not be expensive for a defending server. Complying
with this requirement prevents the puzzle construction itself from being a victim
of DoS attacks, where an adversary may flood bogus requests to exhaust the
computational resources of a server.
4. The solutions are easy to verify.
The reason for this requirement is similar to the one above. To protect a defending
server from depleting its resources to verify a large number of random answers, the
verification process should be as simple as possible. For example, the comparison
of two numerical values could be one of the simplest methods, which in particular
depends on the uniqueness of puzzle solutions.
5. The complexity of puzzles is adjustable according to the strength of an attack.
As a puzzle’s complexity increase, the cost of solving a puzzle should also increase.
This gives some flexibility in dealing with the conflict between defending against
DoS attacks efficiently and providing qualified and timely service for legitimate
clients.
4.3 Definition
Some trapdoor one-way algorithms possess a range of useful properties that meet the
requirements above. In this section, we first introduce relevant knowledge about trap-
door functions. Then, we define the proposed Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System
(TCPS), including its security properties. We demonstrate that this system meets all
the requirements as stated above.
First of all, we provide some notations that will be used in the course of this thesis.
We refer to probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines as efficient algorithms [29].
Let F(·) denote a randomised algorithm, and d ← F(·) denote the event that F outputs
the value of d. We denote the probability of event B happening after A1, . . . , An by
Pr[A1; . . . ; An : B].
We say that a function f(n) : N → N is negligible, if for every polynomial B(·)
and sufficiently big n, there exists f(n) ≤ 1/B(n). In fact, the notion of the negligible
probability describes a negligible event f(·) that should rarely happen, even if we
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consider any polynomial-time function B(·) a large number of times. We also denote
that ε = 1/B(n).
4.3.1 One-Way Function
Our proposed system utilises trapdoor one-way functions. Informally, a one-way func-
tion is designed to provide an algorithm which is easy to compute, yet computationally
infeasible to reverse [51]. For example, given x it is easy to compute the value of f(x),
but infeasible to obtain x if given f(x) in polynomial time.
Definition 1 f(·) is a one-way function if for every probabilistic polynomial time ad-
versary A, we require
Pr[ x ← R ; y ← R : A(f(·), y) = x s.t. f(x) = y ] < ε
where R is a random number set.
4.3.2 Trapdoor One-Way Function
We note that a single one-way function is meaningless for cryptographers, as no one
can decrypt a message that is encrypted by a one-way function. A trapdoor one-way
function arises on the basis of solving such a problem, which is a special one-way
function equipped with some secrets called “trapdoor”. A trapdoor one-way function
is uniformly easy to compute in one direction, but hard to reverse. In particular, if the
trapdoor is known, it is also easy to compute x by reversing the function f(x).
Definition 2 f(·) is a trapdoor one-way function if for every probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A, we require
Pr
[
x ← R ; y ← R : A(f(·), y, d) = x
s.t. f(x) = y ∧ f−1(y, d) = x
]
= 1
where d is the trapdoor of the function f(x).
4.3.3 Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System
The aim of a trapdoor-based client puzzle system is to protect service availability
transferred between a web server S and legitimate clients C against DoS attacks. The
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system exploits a specific trapdoor one-way function, where a creator of puzzles (the
server S) can efficiently compute the correct solution, while other solvers (legitimate
clients C and an adversary A) must perform a brute-force search to obtain the answers.
The system consists of three efficient algorithms for generating random puzzles, solving
the puzzles and verifying the solutions of these puzzles, respectively.
Definition 3 A Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System (TCPS) consists of a three-tuple
of polynomial algorithms (Gen, Solve, V erify), where
• Gen : Puzzle generation algorithm used by a defending server S. It takes security
parameter t and a difficulty level l as input, and outputs a random puzzle P along
with a correct solution Ss to the puzzle P . That is
(P , Ss) ← Gen(1t, l).
Indeed, a puzzle P comprises two elements denoted as P = (σ, [α, β]) where σ is
a puzzle parameter, and [α, β] is a search range of length l. That is l = |β − α|.
• Solve : Puzzle-solving algorithm. This is an efficient algorithm for a client C to
solve the puzzles. On input P = (σ, [α, β]), it computes an answer Sc.
Sc ← Solve(P)
• V erify : A deterministic algorithm performed by S. On input Ss and Sc, it
outputs either one or zero.
Verify(Ss, Sc) ∈ {1, 0}
Success: Define the success of a client solving a puzzle by:
Verify(Ss, Sc) = 1, if Ss = Sc holds.
The following working diagram (Fig 4.1) is a simple prototype for our Trapdoor-
based Client Puzzle System (TCPS), in which a defending server takes charge of two
positions: “Creator” and “Verifier”, and the clients are responsible for “Solver”.
Definition 4 Difficulty of a puzzle [6]
Let P = (σ, [α, β]) be one part of the outcome Gen(·) where σ is a parameter for a
client C solving a puzzle, and [α, β] is a search range for the answer along with the
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Figure 4.1: A Simple Prototype For The TCPS
width |β − α| = l. A defending server S sends P = (σ, [α, β]) to C, and receives the
answer Sc correspondingly. We require that the amount of computation that a client
needs to perform for the correct answer is equal to l/2 - half the length of a search
range on average.
We require that TCPS schemes should always hold the following security properties.
Correctness: We require that all the answers that are computed correctly by Solve(·),
will always pass the verification. That is
Pr


(P , Ss) ← Gen(1k, l);
Sc ← Solve(P) :
1 ← Verify(Ss, Sc)

 = 1
Semantic Security: For every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the proba-
bility of finding another efficient algorithm to compute a puzzle’s solution, rather than
performing a brute-force search in the given range [α, β], is negligible.
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Pr


̂Solve(·) 6= Solve(·) ;
Ŝc ← ̂Sol( P ) :
1 ← Verify( Ss, Ŝc )

 < ε
Collision-resistance: The probability of the existence of two uniform integers Sc and
S ′c in the search range [α, β] is negligible.
Pr


Sc ← Solve( P ) ;
S ′c ∈ [α, β] ; S ′c = Sc :
1 ← Verify( Ss, S ′c )

 < ε
Theoretically, there is only one correct answer for the puzzle in the range [α, β], which
ensures that only the client who accurately complies with the description of the puzzle
to perform the searching and the computation can obtain the right solution.
Information Theoretic Secrecy: A puzzle solution Sc does not reveal any informa-
tion about either possible puzzle constructions or other secrets of a defending server.
Pr


Pi = ( σi, [αi, βi] ) ;
Sci ← Solve(Pi) :
{σi+1| αi+1| βi+1} ← Sci

 < ε
4.4 Security Assumption
It is well-known that the security of many existing public-key cryptosystems, such as
RSA, Diffie-Hellman and DSS [35], is based on one assumption: that there is a mathe-
matically hard problem which is difficult for cryptanalysts to solve in a polynomial time.
Two prevalent hard problems widely used by cryptographers are the discrete logarithm
and factorisation [64]. In the following chapters, we will employ these hard problems,
combined with trapdoor functions, to develop two novel client puzzle schemes. Before
that, we shall introduce definitions of these hard problems.
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4.4.1 The RSA Assumption
The factorisation problem is a problem used to calculate a series of prime integers from
a given number. In current cryptosystems, people particularly focus on factoring an
integer N which is the product of two large primes p and q. This problem has been
studied by many researchers, and even now, it still cannot be solved efficiently.
The RSA Assumption is derived from the hardness of factorisation problem, which
was first introduced by Rivest and Shamir in [50]. They claimed that it is infeasible
to compute e-root in the group of order φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1), where e ∈ Z∗φ(N) is
relatively prime to φ(N). That is given N , e, and a random element y ∈ Z∗N , it is hard
to compute x such that xe = y (mod N). More formally, we define it as follows.
Assumption 1 The RSA Assumption holds, if for all probabilistic polynomial time
adversaries A, the following probability
Pr


N ← RSA(p, q) ;
e ← Z∗φ(N) ; y ← Z∗N :
A(N, y, e) = x s.t. xe = y (mod N)

 < ε
As a matter of fact, computing e-root in Z∗N is equivalent to solving the factori-
sation problem. Assume that a polynomial adversary A is able to factorise N into two
large primes p and q efficiently. He can then compute φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1), and
exploit the extended Euclidean algorithm [9] to obtain d such that
e · d ≡ 1 (mod φ(N))
That is
d ≡ e−1 (mod φ(N)).
Now, he can obtain x = yd (mod N) by taking the modular exponentiation instead
of the e-root computation.
Hence, we believe that if the factorisation problem is hard in polynomial time,
the RSA Assumption holds. However, if people can find an efficient way to solve the
factorisation problem in the future, the RSA Assumption will not be valid any more.
Another confusing problem which should be noted is that the security of the RSA
scheme1 does not depend totally on the factorisation problem. This means that an
1The RSA scheme can provide encryption and signature functions [35], which is a different notion
from the RSA Assumption.
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attacker may break the implementation of the RSA without the operation of factoring
N . Some of these types of attacks have been reported in [51] and [10], such as “Chosen
Ciphertext Attack”, “Common Modulus Attack”, “Low Encryption Exponent Attack”,
etc.
We use Table (4.1) to illustrate the relationship between the factorisation problem,
the RSA Assumption, and the RSA scheme.
the RSA Assumption ←−− Factorization Problem ?−−→ RSA
(hold) (hard) (secure)
Table 4.1: The Relationship Between Factorisation, RSA Assumption and RSA
4.4.2 The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is a problem that has been researched in
[36, 40]: given a large prime p, a generator α of Z∗p , and a random element β ∈ Z∗p
, it is hard to find the integer x (0 ≤ x ≤ p − 2) such that αx ≡ β (mod p). Many
popular public-key cryptosystems are based on this assumption, such as the ElGamal
system and the DSS [1, 23].
Similarly, we provide a formal presentation of the DLP, in which p is a large prime
(e.g. a 1024-bit number).
Assumption 2 We say that the hardness of the DLP holds, if for all probabilistic
polynomial time adversaries A, the following probability
Pr[ α ∈ Z∗p , β ∈R Z∗p : A(p, α, β) = x s.t. αx ≡ β (mod p) ] < ε
Chapter 5
A Scheme Based On The RSA Assumption
We begin this chapter by introducing a specific trapdoor algorithm whose security de-
pends on the RSA Assumption. We embed this algorithm into our TCPS (Trapdoor-
based Client Puzzle System) framework to implement the puzzle construction phase.
We shall evaluate this algorithm before employing it to develop a RSA Assumption-
based TCPS. Additionally, we shall demonstrate that this proposed scheme satisfies
all the essential requirements and security conditions as stated in Chapter 4.
5.1 Algorithm
In this section, we describe an efficient trapdoor scheme whose security is based on the
RSA Assumption. This scheme has been widely used earlier according to literature
[17, 18, 29]. To embed it into the TCPS, we make some modifications to it in our new
scheme.
Let N be the product of two large primes p and q. Maintain p and q as secrets.
It is computationally infeasible to factorise N for all polynomial adversaries. Denote
φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1). Let e ∈ Z∗φ(N) be a prime such that GCD(e, φ(N)) = 1. g is a
random integer in the group of order φ(N).
Puzzles constructed in this RSA Assumption-based scheme are derived from the
following equation.
M = ga · re (mod N) (5.1)
where a ∈ [1, e− 1], random r ∈ Z∗N . Given a value of M , we find that for each a′ 6= a,
there exists a unique r′ such that M = ga
′ · (r′)e (mod N) holds. We present it as
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follows.
M = ga · re = ga′ · (r′)e (mod N) (5.2)
Indeed, for each a′, the value of r′ is equal to the e-root of M · g−a′ (mod N).
The trapdoor of this algorithm is the value of x = g
1
e (mod N). In this case, we
plug x in Eq (5.1) as follows.
M = ga · re (mod N)
= (xe)a · re (mod N)
= (xa · r)e (mod N) (5.3)
Let y = xa · r, then we show that y equals the e-root of M .
y = M
1
e = xa · r (mod N) (5.4)
Note that if M is kept constant, y is uniformly a constant which inherits the same
property as in Eq (5.2). Given a value of y, for each a 6= a′, there exists a unique r′
such that
y = xa · r (mod N)
= xa−a
′ · r′ (mod N) (5.5)
Now, we can compute
r′ = (y · x−a) · xa′ (mod N) (5.6)
Our scheme is such that, given a pair (a, r), the puzzle creator obtains the values
of M and y (= M
1
e modN). Keeping them constant, the creator varies the value of
a′ for each new puzzle, and meanwhile, computes r′ by using Eq (5.6). Due to lack of
knowledge about x, y, the solvers have to conduct three steps ruled by the creator as
follows, to obtain the answer r′.
(i) Receive the values of M , ga
′
, e, N and a search range for r′ from the creator.
(ii) Pick up a candidate r′ from the range and test whether M = ga
′ · (r′)e modN .
(iii) Repeat (ii) until all possible r′ are tested or a r′ that satisfies Eq (5.1) is found.
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In this puzzle scheme, the computational cost consumed by the creator is quite
distinct from that consumed by solvers. For the creator, it merely needs one modular
multiplication r′ = T · a′ (mod N) to solve a puzzle, because y · x−a can be pre-
computed and referred to as a constant T . A solver, on the other hand, has to perform
a brute-force search and a number of modular exponentiations to determine the answer.
Furthermore, the creator is able to control the computational cost consumed by the
solvers by adjusting the length of the search ranges.
Theorem 1 If Eq (5.2) holds, then the solution r′ computed by Eq (5.6) can be verified.
Proof : Given the initial values of (a, r), we obtain the following result
M = ye = (xa · r)e = (xe)a · re = ga · re = ye (mod N)
To create a new puzzle, we choose a′ and obtain the solution r′ = (y · x−a)xa′ . Then
we verify it in Eq (5.2)
M = ye = [xa−a
′ · (r′)]e = (xa−a′)e · (r′)e (mod N)
= (xa−a
′
)e · [(y · x−a)xa′ ]e (mod N)
= (xe)a−a
′ · ye · (xa′−a)e (mod N)
= ga−a
′ · ye · ga′−a (mod N)
= ye (mod N)
Theorem 2 Under the RSA Assumption, our scheme is secure.
Proof : Before presenting the proof, we firstly recall the RSA Assumption. N is the
product of two large primes p and q. Given two elements e ∈ Z∗φ(N), g ∈ Z∗N ( where
e is relatively prime to φ(N) ), it is computationally infeasible to find a non-negative
integer x such that
xe = g (mod N)
holds, which is equivalent to factoring pq [45].
We assume there is an algorithm A which can output a pair of (a, r) and (a′, r′),
where a 6= a′ and r 6= r′, for given values of M, g, e ∈ Z∗N , such that
M = ga · re = ga′ · (r′)e (mod N)
holds with a non-negligible probability.
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Now, we show that an algorithm B intends to use A to break down our scheme by
computing the trapdoor x = g
1
e (mod N), which is assumed to be secure under the
RSA Assumption. This simulation is described as follows.
After obtaining a pair of values (a, r) and (â, r̂), B transforms the following equation:
M = ga · re = ga′ · (r′)e (mod N)
and obtains
ga−a
′
= (
r′
r
)e (mod N)
Let θ = a − a′. Since a, a′ < e and e is a prime, we note that GCD(θ, e) = 1.
According to the extended Euclidean algorithm [9], we can find two integers m, n such
that mθ + ne = 1. Now, B can obtain the following permutation by using the previous
equation.
g = gmθ+ne = gmθ · gne (mod N)
= (gθ)m · gne (mod N)
= [ (
r′
r
)e ]m · gne (mod N)
= [ (
r′
r
)m · gn ]e (mod N)
If B is able to take e-root computation in Z∗N , he will obtain the trapdoor x, such
that
x = g
1
e = (
r′
r
)m · gn (mod N)
Note that the probability that A outputs a = a′ and b = b′ is equal to 1/N2.
Moreover, e-root computation in a cyclic group (order N) is computationally infeasible
under the RSA Assumption. Hence the success probability of B is lower bounded by
1/N2. We have now completed the proof.
5.2 A RSA Assumption-based TCPS
In this section, we shall present how the above algorithm is used to develop the TCPS.
We assume there are two participants involved, namely a defending server S and a client
C. Additionally, S establishes a TCPS for DoS defence, and C has the ability to solve
puzzles by using the parameters received from S. Now, according to the definition
in Chapter 4, we divide the scheme into four phases, which are the preconstruction
5.2. A RSA Assumption-based TCPS 53
phase, the construction phase, the puzzle-solving phase and the verification phase,
respectively. Apart from the puzzle solving, which is performed on the client’s side,
these phases all run on the server.
1. Pre-construction phase
An analysis of the trapdoor algorithm outlined above indicates that the puzzle
creator (S) needs a number of constants to generate puzzles. Thus, to decrease
computational overheads and improve efficiency in the construction phase, we
introduce pre-computation into our scheme.
The pre-construction procedure is illustrated as follows:
(i) Determine a time interval Td, and the size of set A denoted by n.
There is a trade-off between Td and n, which requires some careful thought.
In fact, the server needs to find the minimum n and the maximum Td that
satisfy the following requirement: n is minimum greater than the maximum
connection ability of the server in each time period. It guarantees that in
the same time period no element in set A can be selected more than once.
For instance, if the hourly maximum connectivity of the server is 50,000 on
average, n should be greater than 50,001 with Td = 1.
(ii) Establish A.
Variable a′ for each new puzzle (M = ga
′ · (r′)e modN) is derived from A.
First of all, the server creates a superincreasing sequence I [51] such that
I = { bi| 1 ≤ i ≤ m,m > n, bi ∈ [1, e− 1] } ∩ { ∀bi, b′i ∈ I|
i′−1∑
i=1
bi < b
′
i }
This means that every item belonging to I is greater than the sum of all the
previous elements. For example, {3, 7, 13, 29, 67} might be a subset of I,
while {3, 5, 7, 11} is not.
To build A, the server randomly picks up n(< m) non-repeated elements
from I. Then, we can obtain A such that
A = {ai| 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ I } ∩ {∀ai, a′i ∈ A, 1 ≤ x ≤ n| a′i 6=
x∑
i=1
ai }
Recalling the property of a superincreasing sequence I, we know that every
instance in A cannot be equal to the sum of any arbitrary instances. Fig
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(5.1) illustrates this property more clearly. Assume that {1, 3, 5, 11, 23} is
a subset of superincreasing sequence I. To set up A, the server chooses four
non-repeatable elements from I randomly. Then, we obtain A = {3, 11, 1, 5}.
Note that we cannot obtain any element in A by summing up any other
discretionary number of elements. For example, 11+1 6= 3+5, 11 6= 3+5+1,
3 + 1 6= 5, and so on.
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Figure 5.1: A Sample of Set A
(iii) Compute GA, which is a multiplier factor for constructing a puzzle.
GA = {gai( modN)|1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ A} ∩ {∀ai, a′i ∈ A, ai 6= a′i| gai 6= ga
′
i}
(iv) Compute XA, which is a multiplier factor for solving a puzzle.
XA = {xai (mod N)| 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ A}
(v) Generate and encrypt the time parameter t.
The form of t is defined as:
{yymmddhh1hh2} ∩ {hh2 − hh1 = Td}
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For instance, when the server selects the time interval Td = 2, a time pa-
rameter for 17:00 to 19:00 on January 9th, 2005 is t = 0501091917. Then,
encrypt t by computing gt( modN) and xt( modN), respectively. Note that
gt and xt are unique in an identical Td, and computed before each new time
period starts.
(vi) Calculate M and T by Eq (5.1) and Eq (5.6)
M = ga · re (mod N)
T = y · x−a = Md · x−a (mod N)
where a ∈ [1, e − 1] and r ∈R Z∗N are a pair of initial values. The server
will publish the value of M as part of the description of puzzles, and keep
T secret.
After accomplishing the pre-construction, the server obtains a number of con-
stants {M , T , A, GA, XA}, and two periodic constants {gt, xt}. Note that
except M being public, the rest are kept secret on the server.
2. Construction phase
When receiving a request from a client C, the server S generates a puzzle P =
(ga
′
, [α, β]) along with its correct solution rs. P is essential for a client solving a
puzzle. rs is stored on the server for verification of the answer returned from the
client. This stage is described as follows.
(i) Compute ga
′
ga
′
= gt · gai (mod N) (5.7)
where gai ∈ GA, t is the current time period and gt is a periodic constant
calculated at the beginning of t. The server picks up random gai ∈ GA to
generate a fresh puzzle, then marks this gai to be unavailable until a new
period comes. This means that when each period starts, all the elements in
GA are available. An element is marked unavailable throughout the same
period, once it is chosen by the server to create a puzzle.
(ii) Generate r′s
xa
′
= xt · xai (mod N) (5.8)
rs = (y · x−a) · xa′ (mod N)
= T · xa′ (mod N)
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Note that the values of i in Eq (5.7) and Eq (5.9) are uniform.
(iii) Obtain a search range [α, β] ⊂ Z∗N
α = rs − c (mod N)
β = α + l (mod N)
for random c ∈ [0, l), where l is the current difficulty level of the puzzles.
3. Puzzle-solving phase
Unlike the other three, this phase is performed on client’s side. We assume that
a client C has installed a specific piece of software which is distributed by the
server. It solves puzzles received from the server by using a fixed equation
M = ga · re (mod N),
a triple of constants (M, e, N), and an interface for accepting puzzle parameters
from the server.
When a client receives a puzzle P , he employs an exhaustive search (brute-force)
to find the answer rc which satisfies the equation. Due to the length of the search
range l = β−α, a client C needs to perform l/2 modular exponentiations to find
the answer rc on average.
4. Verification phase
Upon receiving the answer rc from a client, the server compares it with the stored
solution rs that has been calculated in the construction phase. If they are equal,
Verify(·) outputs 1, which means that authentication of the client is verified, and
the server proceeds with the rest of the request. Otherwise, Verify(·) outputs 0,
and the server drops the request.
Verify(rs, rc) =
{
1 if rs = rc
0 otherwise
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5.3 Parameter Table and Scheme Prototype
We illustrate all the main parameters used in this RSA Assumption-based TCPS in
the following table, along with their corresponding properties and a simple description.
No. Notation Phase Property Public/Private Description
1 l 1 Const* Private difficulty level of puzzles
2 p 1 Const. Private large prime
3 q 1 Const. Private large prime
4 N 1 Const. Public N = pq
5 φ(N) 1 Const. Private φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
6 e 1 Const. Public GCD(e, φ(N)) = 1
7 d 1 Const. Private e · d ≡ 1 modφ(N)
8 g 1 Const. Private g ∈R Z∗φ(N)
9 M 1 Const. Private M = ga · re modN
10 x 1 Const. Private trapdoor x = g
1
e modN
11 y 1 Const. Private y = M
1
e modN
12 a 1 Random - initial value
13 r 1 Random - initial value
14 T 1 Const. Private T = y · x−a modN
15 I 1 Const. Private superincreasing sequence
16 A 1 Const. Private ai ∈ I
17 GA 1 Const. Private g
ai modN
18 XA 1 Const. Private x
ai modN
19 Td 1 Const. Private time interval
20 t 1 Const. Private hh2 − hh1 = Td
21 gt 1 Const* Private -
22 xt 1 Const* Private -
23 a′ 2 Var. Private a′ = t + ai
24 rs 2 Var. Private Server’s solution
25 c 2 Random Private -
26 α 2 Var. Public α = rs − c
27 β 2 Var. Public β = α + l
28 rc 3 Var. Public Client’s solution
Table 5.1: Parameter Table of the RSA Assumption-based TCPS
Notation: “Const.” and “Var.” represent “constant” and “variable” respectively. “Const*” is denoted
as a periodical constant. In particular, l varies according to the strength of an attack. gt and xt
are changed at the beginning of a new time period. “Phase 1, 2, 3” denote “Pre-construction”,
“Construction”, “Puzzle-solving” respectively.
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Server Client
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
M = ga · re = ga′ · (r′)e (mod N)
x = g
1
e (mod N)
y = M
1
e = xa · r (mod N)
secret: x, g, y public: M, e, N
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Pre-construct a puzzle:
– Generate candidate data sets:
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}
XA = {xa1 , xa2 , . . . , xan}
GA = {ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gan}
– Generate gt, xt
for the current time period
– Generate constant: T
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Construct a puzzle:
ga
′
= gt · gai (mod N)
xa
′
= xt · xai (mod N)
rs = T · xa′ (mod N)
random c ∈ [0, l)
[rs − c, rs − c + l] → [α, β] P=(g
a′ , [α, β])−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Search for rc to meet:
M = ga · re (mod N)
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Verify a solution: rc←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
rs
?
= rc
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Allocate resources for a client
or drop a request according to
the correctness of the solution
...
...
... Proceed−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ...
Figure 5.2: A RSA Assumption-based Puzzle Scheme
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5.4 Remarks
Theorem 3 The RSA Assumption-based puzzle scheme will produce a Trapdoor-based
Client Puzzle System.
Proof. We need to show that the above scheme satisfies the requirements of the
Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle System as stated in Chapter 4.
• Correctness. It is easy to verify that answers computed correctly in the puzzle-
solving phase can always pass the final verification on the defending server.
In the proposed scheme, we provide a search range [α, β] which ensures the exis-
tence of the correct solution rs. Because
[α, β] ← [rs − c, rs − c + l] for c ∈ [0, l)
where both c and l are positive integers, this means
rs − c < rs < rs − c + l
Hence, a client can eventually find a rc (= rs) which makes Eq (5.1) valid, as
long as he employs an exhaustive search.
• Semantic Security. Due to the hardness of Factorisation ( or the RSA Assump-
tion), a more efficient way to obtain the correct answer than a brute-force search
cannot be found. We will prove this claim in the Security Considerations section
below.
• Collision-resistance. According to the property presented in Eq (5.2), for each
a′ ∈ [1, e− 1], there exists a unique value r′ ∈ Z∗N which can satisfy the equation
M = ga
′ · (r′)e modN .
• Information Theoretic Secrecy. No client can pre-compute a puzzle by guessing
or revealing the secret components of the server.
– If a client knows the trapdoor x, he can solve all the puzzles created by
this scheme efficiently. However, we have proved in Theorem 2 that the
probability of this scenario is negligible under the RSA Assumption.
– Puzzles generated by the server can be viewed as random.
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The server establishes a random and non-repeatable set A (A = {ai|1 ≤
i ≤ n, ai ∈ [1, e − 1]}) in the pre-construction phase. On the basis of A,
the server calculates GA (GA = {gai (mod p) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ A}) as
a necessary parameter for creating puzzles. Note that the values of gai are
irregular, and hence, the probability of guessing an instance in GA is 1/N .
When N is large enough, we can say that this probability is negligible.
This scheme also meets the essential requirements that we advocated in Chapter 4 for
promising client puzzles.
Remark 1 The computational resources consumed by a client to solve a puzzle are
greater than those used by the server to generate the puzzle and verify the solution.
A defending server performs three modular multiplications and two additions to
create a puzzle and obtain the solution at the same time.
To produce ga
′
, the server performs one modular multiplication:
ga
′
= gt · gai (mod N)
To obtain the solution, the server performs two modular multiplications:
r′s = T · xa
′
= T · xt · xai (mod N)
To generate the search range [α, β], the server performs two additions:
α = r′s − c ; β = α + l
To verify a solution, the server only needs to make a comparison.
rs
?
= rc
To solve a puzzle, however, a client has to conduct on average l/2 modular expo-
nentiations and comparisons, which consume much more computational resources than
modular multiplications and modular additions [37]. In addition, we ensure that the
size of p and q are large enough to resist any attacks on factorisation. As a result, the
answer can only be obtained by exhaustively searching the seed range and performing
modular exponentiations until the correct instance that satisfies the public equation is
found.
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Remark 2 Our scheme is better than the Hash function [5] and the Diffie-Hellman
[6] based puzzle schemes.
• The unique solution guarantees that the defending server can perform a simple
comparison to verify puzzle solutions. This is more efficient and effective in
protecting the verification phase against DoS attacks than the Hash function
based puzzle scheme, in which the defending server is required to perform a hash
function for solution verification.
• To adjust the difficulty of a puzzle, we exploit a non-negative integer l to control
the length of a search range. The value of l varies according to the strength of a
DoS attack. When the strength of an attack degree is low, l is correspondingly
small and the cost of solving a puzzle is insignificant for a client. If an attack
worsens and l enlarges, a client has to supply more resources to find a solution.
On average, it requires l/2 modular exponentiations to solve a puzzle. Hence, our
scheme is more easily measurable than the Hash function based puzzle scheme.
• To avoid puzzle iteration, the Hash function based scheme requires that a record
of the used instances is kept for a long time, and it performs two comparisons in
puzzle construction and verification respectively. However, relying on the time
parameter t, our scheme can always obtain unique puzzles without wasting mem-
ory space and computational time. The items calculated in the pre-construction
phase can also be reused in every new time interval.
• As well as relying on the outsourcing for puzzle construction, the Diffie-Hellman
based puzzle scheme requires a modular exponentiation to obtain a correct so-
lution. Note that a modular exponentiation can be divided into many mod-
ular multiplications [37] and a large number of modular additions. Our RSA
Assumption-based scheme, on the other hand, only needs three modular multi-
plications and two additions to obtain a puzzle and its corresponding solution,
which is more efficient.
• Our scheme is resistant to eavesdropping attacks. As we claimed earlier, no
puzzle construction information is revealed during communication between the
defending server and its clients. In addition, each connection request has a unique
solution, so that eavesdropping is rarely advantageous to an attacker.
• By varying the values of public instances (such as M , e, N) and constant instances
5.5. Security Considerations 62
(such as A, GA, XA), distinct web servers can obtain different puzzle schemes.
This is more flexible for current network servers that possess various capabilities.
Through these remarks we conclude that our RSA Assumption-based puzzle scheme
is qualified in theory.
5.5 Security Considerations
In this section, we will inspect the following possible attacks and show that our scheme
holds strong security properties (under the RSA Assumption) against them.
(1) An adversary intends to predict the answer rc from a sequence of valid answers
that he obtained previously. Recall that
M = ga · re (mod N)
where M, N, e, ga are the public parameters of a puzzle. The adversary then
performs a brute-force search to find a valid answer r such that
re =
M
ga
(mod N).
He can also deduce the following equation, even without knowledge of d.
r = (
M
ga
)d (mod N)
Similarly, he can also compute another answer
r′ = (
M
ga′
)d (mod N).
Now, he can obtain a constant
ϕ =
r
r′
= (
ga
′
ga
)d = (ga
′−a)d (mod N).
Assume that
r′′ = (
M
ga′′
)d (mod N).
Then,
r′′ · ϕ = ( M
ga′′
)d · (ga′−a)d
= (
M
ga′′+a−a′
)d (mod N).
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If the adversary can find that there is a relationship between the elements in A
that satisfies â = a′′ + a− a′, he is able to pre-compute the answer
r̂c = (
M
gâ
)d = (
M
ga′′+a−a′
)d = r′′ · ϕ (mod N).
However, an important property of set A is that all the elements are derived from
a superincreasing sequence. Hence, there is no such relationship.
(2) An adversary intends to reveal the secret constant y from the public parame-
ters. However, he finds he has to compute the e-root of M (order N), which is
equivalent to factorising pq.
(3) An adversary attempts to find out about set A from a sequence of public para-
meters ga, ga
′
. . . in the same period t. He knows that
ga = gai · gt (mod N)
ga
′
= ga
′
i · gt (mod N)
then
ga
ga′
=
gai
ga
′
i
= gai−a
′
i (mod N).
In fact, the adversary does not know whether the values of ga and ga
′
come from
the same period, because both t and g are secret parameters in our scheme. Even
if we assume that t for ga and ga
′
are uniform, the adversary cannot obtain any
information about set A. Recalling the Discrete Logarithm Problem, we know
that it is still hard to compute (ai − a′i) even if g is known.
5.6 Summary
This chapter has depicted a novel client puzzle scheme embedded with an efficient trap-
door algorithm. This scheme has two distinct features: the computational overheads
are low, and the difficulty level of puzzles is measurable. We also presented that this
scheme is provably secure under the RSA Assumption.
Section 5.1 elaborated on a trapdoor algorithm, and proved that its security relies
on the RSA Assumption. In Section 5.2, we implemented the Trapdoor-based Client
Puzzle System (TCPS) by combining its definition (outlined in Chapter 4) with this
trapdoor algorithm. In order to reduce the computational overheads of puzzle con-
struction, we introduced a “Pre-construction” phase into our scheme. The major task
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of “Pre-construction” is to pre-compute a sequence of constants that is required in
puzzle construction and verification. We also demonstrated that puzzles produced by
our proposed scheme satisfy all essential requirements and security conditions.
In this RSA Assumption-based TCPS, a defending server needs three modular
multiplications and two additions to generate a puzzle along with a solution. A quick
solution verification is achieved by only one value comparison. On the other hand, the
complexity of puzzles can be controlled via an integer l, which is actually the length
of solution search ranges. This means that the server can vary l to adjust the number
of computations on the client’s side, according to the strength of DoS attacks.
Section 5.3 provided a parameter table and a work prototype for this scheme. In
Section 5.4, several possible attacks were considered. Under the RSA Assumption, our
proposed scheme can defend against all these attacks.
In conclusion, this RSA Assumption-based TCPS does work effectively and effi-
ciently.
Chapter 6
A Scheme Based On The DLP
This chapter will illustrate another trapdoor algorithm whose security is based on the
hardness of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Similarly, we shall try to adapt this
algorithm to the TCPS to fulfill puzzle construction. We shall maintain that this
DLP-based scheme also meets the essential requirements and security conditions in
the definition of the TCPS. In particular, compared with the RSA Assumption-based
TCPS, this new scheme is expected to further diminish the cost of puzzle construction
in two ways: one is in saving storage space, and the other one is in cutting down the
number of modular multiplications.
6.1 Algorithm
The algorithm that we will introduce in this section is derived from Schnorr’s Signa-
ture [12, 52], which was proposed in 1989 and could provide encryption and signature
functions. Its security relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. First
of all, we describe the algorithm as follows.
Let p be a large prime, and q be another prime which is the prime factor of p− 1.
The size of p and q should be selected with care to ensure that DLP in Z∗p is hard. g is
a generator of the group G (order q). Denote x ∈ Z∗q as a positive and secret integer.
Let l be the difficulty lever of puzzles.
Our scheme is based on the following equations, in which random a, b ∈ Z∗q.
h = gx (mod p) (6.1)
C = ga · hb (mod p) (6.2)
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W = a + b · x (mod q) (6.3)
Examining the above equations, we find a transformation by assembling them to-
gether as shown below.
• Put Eq (6.1) into Eq (6.2).
C = ga · hb = ga · (gx)b
= ga · gbx
= ga+bx (mod p) (6.4)
• Put Eq (6.3) into Eq (6.4).
C = ga+bx = gW (mod p) (6.5)
Note that g, p are constant in Eq (6.5). Hence, if we can maintain the constancy
of W , C should be a constant as well.
From equation (6.3), we can easily verify that a and b can be chosen arbitrarily, if
the secret value x is known, to obtain W . Moreover, by a given random a′ ∈ Z∗q, we
can compute a unique b′ ∈ Z∗p by Eq (6.6) such that W is kept constant.
b′ = (W − a′) · x−1 (mod q) (6.6)
Our puzzle scheme operates so that using Eq (6.3) and (6.5), the puzzle creator
can easily compute the initial values of W and C from a pair (a, b). Then, keeping
them constant, the creator changes the value of a′ for each new puzzle, and calculates a
corresponding solution b′ through Eq (6.6). He also generates a search range associated
with b′, where the range length equals l (recall that l is the difficulty level). The
puzzle creator should broadcast p, h and Eq (6.2), but keep g, x, q, and W secret. In
consequence, the only feasible method for a puzzle solver is to perform an exhaustive
search in the candidate range to find a b′ that makes Eq (6.2) hold.
Since he knows the trapdoor - Eq (6.6), the puzzle creator performs only one ad-
dition1 and one modular multiplication to obtain a solution for each fresh a′. On the
other hand, a solver must compute a sequence of modular exponentiations for testing
each instance in the given range until he finds the correct answer. Meanwhile, the
creator can adjust the size of the search range - l to control the computational costs
consumed by the solvers.
1A subtraction operation can be viewed as an addition in a computer system.
6.1. Algorithm 67
Theorem 4 If Eq (6.2) holds, then the solution b′ computed by Eq (6.6) can be verified.
Proof : Given the initial values of (a, b), we can obtain the following result.
C = ga · hb = ga · gbx = ga+bx = gW (mod p)
To create a new puzzle, we choose a′ and compute the solution b′ = (W − a) · x−1
(mod q). Now, we verify it in Eq (6.2).
C = gW = ga
′ · gb′ = ga′ · h(W−a′)·x−1 (mod p)
= ga
′ · g(W−a′)·x−1·x (mod p)
= ga
′ · gW−a′ (mod p)
= gW (mod p)
Theorem 5 Our scheme is secure assuming the hardness of Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem.
Proof: To illustrate our proof, first let us recall the assumption made in the Discrete
Logarithm Problem. Given two elements of a group, gv and h, it is computationally
infeasible to find a non-negative integer x such that
h = gx (mod p)
holds, where the size of p is appropriately chosen (e.g. 1024 bits).
We assume there is an algorithm A that, given C, g, h ∈ Zp∗, outputs a, b such
that
C = ga · hb (mod p)
holds with a non-negligible probability.
We will show an algorithm B that uses A to solve an instance of a Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem which is assumed to be hard.
To be more precise, the task of algorithm B is to output
x = logg h (mod p)
given g, h ∈ Z∗p for a prime p. This simulation is as follows.
First, B provides g, h, p as the public parameters to A. Then, B performs the
following:
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• Select a random value θ ∈ Z∗q , where q | p− 1.
• Compute: C∗ = gθ mod p.
Finally, B provides C∗ to A, and with a non-negligible probability, A outputs: (a, b)
where:
C∗ = ga · hb (mod p)
holds. Now, the simulation is restarted. Again, first A is a provided with the public
parameters g, h, p, and finally given C∗. A will produce another forgery (â, b̂) where
C∗ = gâ · hb̂ (mod p)
holds. If â = a and b̂ = b hold, then the last simulation needs to be repeated until
â 6= a and b̂ 6= b. We note that A will output â = a and b̂ = b with probability 1/q2.
After obtaining two values (a, b) and (â, b̂), B gathers the following equations:
C∗ = ga · hb (mod p)
C∗ = gâ · hb̂ (mod p)
Hence, B derives:
ga · hb = gâ · hb̂ (mod p)
which implies:
a + bx = â + b̂x (mod q)
or
x · (b− b̂) = â− a (mod q)
and
x = (â− a)(b− b̂)−1 (mod q)
Note that x is the solution to the DLP problem. The probability of success of B is
lower bounded by 1/q2, which is non-negligible. Hence, we have provided the proof.
6.2 A DLP-based TCPS
This section will present how a new TCPS works by using this DLP-based trapdoor
algorithm. We still consider two participants in this scheme: a defending server S
which can distribute puzzles for DoS defence; and a client C who is willing to pay
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a countable computational cost to obtain service from S when it is suffering a DoS
attack.
Similarly, we split the scheme into four phases, and use preprocessing to calculate
and store a number of constants for puzzle construction and verification, which is
expected to relieve the computational burden for S. Although there are some uniform
parameters, such as Td, t, which have been defined in Chapter 5, we still repeat them
here to show this scheme in its entirety. An analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness
of our scheme will be provided at the end of this section.
Now, we begin with the four phases.
1. Pre-construction phase
(i) Determine a time interval Td and the size of A denoted by n.
Similar to the definition stated in Chapter 5, the relationship between Td
and n is a compromise. The server needs a minimum n and a maximum Td
to meet the following requirement: in each time period, n is by minimum
greater than the maximum connection ability of the server. It means that
no instance in set A can be chosen for puzzle construction more than once
in same time period.
(ii) Establish A.
A is a random and non-repeated integer set.
A = {ai| ai ∈ Z∗q, | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∩ {∀am, an ∈ A| am 6= an}
(iii) Compute GA.
GA is computed by the server.
GA = {gai (mod p)| 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ A}
(iv) Generate and encrypt t
t is a time parameter which is in the form of
{yymmddhh1hh2} ∩ {hh2 − hh1 = Td}.
We can adjust the form of t according to the designated Td. For instance, if
Td = 30 minutes, the form of t can be described as
{yymmddhhmm1mm2} ∩ {mm2 −mm1 = 30}.
Then, the server computes gt (mod p) at the beginning of each new time
period.
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(v) Compute initial C, W , wt and x
−1 (mod q).
Given a random pair (a, b) ⊂ Z∗q , the server obtains
W = a + b · x (mod q)
and
C = gW (mod p).
Compute
wt = W − t (mod q).
Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, the server easily computes x−1
(mod q).
In the pre-construction phase, the server obtains constants {W , C, x−1 A, GA}
and two periodic constants {gt, wt}.
2. Construction phase
When receiving a request from a client C, the server S generates a puzzle P =
(ga
′
, [α, β]) along with its correct solution bs. P is essential for a client solving a
puzzle. bs is stored on the server for verification of the answer returned from the
client. This stage is described as follows.
(i) Compute ga
′
ga
′
= gt · gai (mod p) (6.7)
where gai ∈ GA, t is the current time period and gt is a periodic constant
calculated at the beginning of t. The server picks up random gai ∈ GA to
generate a fresh puzzle, then marks this gai to be unavailable until a new
period comes. This means that when each period starts, all the elements in
GA are available. An element is marked unavailable throughout the same
period, once it is chosen by the server to create a puzzle.
(ii) Generate bs
bs = (W − a′) · x−1 (mod q)
= [W − (t + ai)] · x−1 (mod q)
= (wt − ai) · x−1 (mod q) (6.8)
Note that the values of i in Eq (6.7) and Eq (6.8) are uniform.
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(iii) Obtain a search range [α, β] ⊂ Z∗q
α = bs − c (mod q)
β = α + l (mod q)
for random c ∈ [0, l), where l is the current difficulty level of the puzzles.
3. Puzzle-solving phase
Unlike the other three, this phase is performed on the client’s side. We assume
that a client C has installed a specific piece of software which is distributed by
the server. It solves puzzles received from the server by using a fixed equation
C = ga · hb (mod p),
a triple of constants (C, h, p), and an interface for accepting puzzle parameters
from the server.
When a client receives a puzzle P , he employs an exhaustive search (brute-force)
to find the answer bc which satisfies the equation. Due to the length of the
search range l = β − α, a client C needs to perform on average l/2 modular
exponentiations to find the answer bc.
4. Verification phase
Upon receiving the answer bc from a client, the server compares it with the stored
solution bs that has been calculated in the construction phase. If they are equal,
Verify(·) outputs 1, which means that authentication of the client is verified, and
the server proceeds with the rest of the request. Otherwise, Verify(·) outputs 0,
and the server drops the request.
Verify(bs, bc) =
{
1 if bs = bc
0 otherwise
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6.3 Parameter Table and Scheme Prototype
No. Notation Phase Property Public/Private Description
1 l 1 (*)Const. Private difficulty level of puzzles
2 p 1 Const. public large prime
3 q 1 Const. Private q|p− 1
4 x 1 Const. Private random x ∈ Z∗q
5 g 1 Const. Private g is a generator in Z∗q
6 h 1 Const. Public h = gx (mod p)
7 a 1 Random - initial value
8 b 1 Random - initial value
9 C 1 Const. Public C = ga · hb mod p
10 W 1 Const. Private W = a + bx (mod q)
11 Td 1 Const. Private time interval
12 t 1 (*)Const. Private hh2 − hh1 = Td
13 gt 1 (*)Const. Private -
14 wt 1 (*)Const. Private wt = W − t (mod q)
15 x−1 1 Const. Private -
16 A 1 Const. Private ai ∈ I
17 GA 1 Const. Private g
ai modN
18 ga
′
2 Var. Private ga
′
= gt · gai (mod p)
19 bs 2 Var. Private Server’s solution
20 r 2 Random Private -
21 α 2 Var. Public α = rs − r
22 β 2 Var. Public β = α + l
23 bc 3 Var. Public Client’s answer
Table 6.1: Parameter Table of the DLP-based TCPS
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Server Client
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
h = gx (mod p)
C = ga · hb (mod p)
W = a + b · x (mod q)
secret: g, x, W, q public: C, h, p
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Pre-construct a puzzle:
– Generate candidate data sets:
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}
GA = {ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gan}
– Generate: gt, wt
for the current time period
– Initial constants: x−1
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Construct a puzzle:
ga
′
= gt · gai (mod p)
bs = (wt − ai) · x−1 (mod q)
random r ∈ [0, l)
[bs − r, bs − r + l] → [α, β] P=(g
a′ , [α, β])−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Search for bc to meet:
C = ga · hb (mod p)
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Verify a solution : bc←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
bs
?
= bc
– – – – – – – – – – – – –
Allocate resources for a client
or drop a request according to
the correctness of the solution
...
...
... Continue−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ...
Figure 6.1: A DLP-based Puzzle Scheme
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6.4 Remarks
Theorem 6 The DLP-based puzzle scheme will produce a Trapdoor-based Client Puzzle
System.
Proof. We need to show that this DLP-based puzzle scheme meets all the security
requirements as outlined in the definition of the TCPS.
• Correctness. It is easy to verify that answers computed correctly in the puzzle-
solving phase can always pass the verification.
In the proposed scheme, we provide a search range [α, β] which ensures the exis-
tence of the correct solution bs. Because
[α, β] ← [bs − r, bs − r + l] for r ∈ [0, l)
where both r, l are positive integers, this means
bs − r < bs < bs − r + l
Hence, a client can eventually find a bc (= bs) which makes Eq (5.1) valid, as
long as he employs an exhaustive search.
• Semantic Security. Due to the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem, a
more efficient way to obtain the correct answer than a brute-force search cannot
be found. We will prove this claim in the Security Considerations section below.
• Collision-resistance. According to the property presented in Eq (6.2), for each
a′ ∈ Z∗p, there exists a unique value b′ ∈ Z∗q which can satisfy the equation
C = ga
′ · hb′ mod p.
• Information Theoretic Secrecy. In the pre-construction process, the defending
server generates a random and non-repeatable data set A (A = {ai|1 ≤ i ≤
n, ai ∈ Z∗q }). According to set A, the server obtains a multiplier factor set GA
(GA = {gai (mod p) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai ∈ Z∗q }) in which the values of gai are
consequently irregular.
When the defending server constructs a puzzle, it performs the following compu-
tation:
ga
′
= gt · gai
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where gai is randomly selected from GA. We notice that the probability of a client
successfully predicting a puzzle equals 1/qn. When q and n are big enough, pre-
computing a puzzle is computationally infeasible in the time period t.
This scheme also meets the essential requirements that we advocated in Chapter 4 for
promising client puzzles.
Remark 3 The computational resources consumed by a client to solve a puzzle are
greater than those used by the server to generate a puzzle and verify its solution.
A defending server performs two modular multiplications and three additions to
create a puzzle and obtain the solution.
To produce ga
′
, the server performs one modular multiplication:
ga
′
= gt · gai (mod p)
To obtain the solution, the server performs one modular multiplication and one
addition:
bs = (wt − ai) · x−1 (mod q)
where wt is computed at the beginning of the current time period.
To generate the search range [α, β], the server performs two additions:
α = bs − r
β = α + l < N
To verify a solution, the server only needs to make a comparison.
bs
?
= bc
Since we ensure that the size of p and q are large enough to resist any attacks on
the DLP, the answer can only be obtained by exhaustively searching the seed range
and performing modular exponentiations until the correct instance that satisfies the
public equation is found. In consequence, to solve a puzzle, a client has to conduct on
average l/2 modular exponentiations and comparisons, which is much more than the
defending server does.
Remark 4 This DLP-based puzzle scheme is better than the Hash function [5] and the
Diffie-Hellman [6] based schemes, and also even better than the RSA Assumption-based
puzzle scheme.
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Similarly, the DLP-based TCPS is more efficient and effective than most proposed
puzzle schemes.
• A quick verification is achieved by using only one comparison, which relies on the
uniqueness of puzzle solutions.
• The defending server can adjust the complexity of client puzzles by changing
the value of l. Moreover, the defending server is able to predict the average
computational cost on the client’s side.
• Most constant instances computed in the pre-construction phase can be reused
in each time period, which reduce the workload of the defending server.
• Like the RSA Assumption-based puzzle scheme, this new method is also resistant
to eavesdropping attacks.
• Compared to the RSA Assumption-based puzzle scheme, this DLP-based scheme
has two advantages:
– Reducing computational costs. The DLP-based scheme only needs two mod-
ular multiplications and three modular additions, whilst the RSA Assumption-
based one requires three modular multiplications and two modular additions.
– Saving memory space. In the pre-construction phase, the DLP-based scheme
only needs two constant sets A and GA. The RSA Assumption-based one,
on the other hand, requires three constant sets A, GA and XA.
Following the above remarks, we conclude that the DLP-based puzzle scheme is
qualified in theory.
6.5 Security Considerations
In this section, the proposed digital signatures will be analysed by inspecting the
following possible attacks. We show that if an adversary intends to break our puzzle
scheme, he has to solve the the discrete logarithm problem in Z∗p, which is expected to
be hard.
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• Scenario 1. An adversary attempts to find the secret integer x from the public
parameters h and p, since h = gx (mod p). The adversary finds that even
though he knows g2, he still has to compute a discrete logarithm in Z∗p.
• Scenario 2. An adversary intends to find the secret constant W from the
public parameter C, p, since C = gW (mod p). He finds a similar situation
with Scenario 1. He has to compute a discrete logarithm in Z∗p, even though he
knows g.
• Scenario 3. An adversary intends to find secret information about the puzzle
construction a′ from the public parameter ga
′
. This is still hard because it is also
a typical discrete logarithm.
6.6 Summary
This chapter has described another trapdoor algorithm, which is also suitable for the
TCPS. This new client puzzle system is secure assuming the hardness of the DLP.
Section 6.1 elaborated on this trapdoor algorithm, and proved that its security relies
on the Discrete Logarithm Problem. In Section 6.2, we implemented the Trapdoor-
based Client Puzzle System (TCPS) by combining its definition (outlined in Chapter 4)
with this DLP-based trapdoor algorithm. Similar to the RSA Assumption-based puzzle
scheme, there are four phases in this new scheme, which are “Pre-construction” phase,
“Construction” phase, “Puzzle-solving” phase and “Verification” phase respectively.
Compared with the RSA Assumption-based scheme, this DLP-based TCPS has
two more major advantages: reducing computational costs by using two modular mul-
tiplications and three additions to construct a puzzle (the RSA Assumption-based one
requires three modular multiplications and two additions); saving memory space in
the pre-construction phase by calculating and storing only two constant sets (the RSA
Assumption-based one requires three constant sets).
We also demonstrated that puzzles produced by this DLP-based scheme satisfy all
essential requirements and security conditions.
In conclusion, this DLP-based TCPS is qualified in DoS defences.
2g is also kept secret in this scheme.
Chapter 7
System Description and Discussion
In this chapter, we shall describe the working environment for our Trapdoor-based
Client Puzzle System (TCPS), and how a defending server will work together with the
TCPS. We shall provide a coarse-gained configuration for system parameters, which
will enable the server to detect DoS attacks and start up the defence system in time.
Moreover, we will give an example of how to determine the difficulty level of puzzles
according to the load on the defending server. After that, we shall discuss several
possible attacks against the TCPS, and further solutions will be analysed.
7.1 Working Environment
To imitate the external environment surrounding the TCPS, we create an attack model
and assume that there are four basic components in a network: a defending server
deploying a client puzzle protection, a number of normal clients who are willing and
able to pay some computational costs for quality service when the server is suffering
from a DoS attack, a malicious client (or an adversary) with limited computational
resources who is attempting to launch a Distributed Denial-of-Service attack, and some
unwitting accomplices whose machines are called “Zombies” and serve as a platform for
a DoS attack. To provide service, the defending server and a client communicate with
each other under a certain network protocol, in which our client puzzle mechanism is
embedded.
We make the following assumptions about the capabilities of the adversary and the
“Zombies”. The first three have been explained by Juels and Brainard [33], and are
included in the following list:
1. The adversary cannot modify packets sent from any client to the defending server.
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2. The adversary cannot significantly delay the packets sent from any client to the
defending server.
3. The adversary and the “Zombies” can exploit spoofed IP addresses to launch a
DoS attack.
4. “Zombies” can comply with the adversary’s command to launch cooperated at-
tacks at a designated time, but they cannot help the adversary to compute puz-
zles.
5. An adversary can deploy network worms to recruit a cohort of “Zombie” machines
in the widespread network. However, he/she cannot generally compromise routers
in the middle of the network. Based on this assumption, we consider that an
adversary can only perform limited eavesdropping on the network.
4. All client machines have the same processing power to devote to puzzle solving,
and we view an adversary as a compromised client machine. Since our client
puzzle system is deployed in conjunction with conventional time-outs, only the
solution returned before its expiration can be accepted by the defending server.
Consequently, a legitimate client can easily compute a single puzzle and send
it back in time, whereas an adversary must have access to large amounts of
computational resources to achieve his goal. Due to the fourth assumption above,
an adversary cannot gather such large amounts of resources on his own.
7.2 System Description
We shall now look at how a system using our trapdoor-based client puzzle works for a
defending server and legitimate clients. Our scheme begins with a regular examination
of a defending server to determine whether it is currently under a DoS attack. A
standard parameter for an attack can be the status of buffer space consumed or the
number of TCP connections. Here, we prefer the status of buffer space consumed as a
standard; so let Bf denote the whole buffer space of a defending server and Csm be the
number of buffers consumed. We assume there are five values of Csm which reflect the
strength of an attack (this can be adjusted flexibly according to different web servers),
and we call them 1 to 5. When less than half of Bf is consumed, the value of Csm is
zero, which means there is no attack alarm for a defending server. When the number
of consumed buffers comes to half of Bf , the value of Csm is increased to 1, indicating
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that the server is suspected of being under an attack. From now on, the defending
server needs to construct and send out a puzzle for every client who is applying for a
connection until the alarm is removed again. When the number of consumed buffers
increases to 3/5 Bf , 7/10 Bf , 4/5 Bf , and 9/10 Bf respectively, the values of Csm are
2, 3, 4, and 5 correspondingly.
We have another parameter l – the difficulty level of a puzzle, which decides the
length of the search range related to Csm. When Csm is zero, the value of l is also
zero. When Csm is increased to 1, l becomes 10 (the value of l can also be adjusted
according to different web servers). As Csm increases, the value of l appears to grow
exponentially. We describe some variations below:
Csm = 0, l = 0;
Csm = 1, l = 10;
Csm = 2, l = 100;
Csm = 3, l = 1, 000;
Csm = 4, l = 10, 000;
Csm = 5, l = 100, 000;
We can see that the difficulty of a puzzle can be increased from 0 to a figure that
is computationally infeasible as an attack becomes more severe.
We describe the details of our defending system as follows.
1. Csm = 0, which means there is no attack alarm for our defending server.
When a client sends an initial connection request and an enquiry as to whether
the server is under a DoS attack, the server answers “No”. Then the client and
the server should continue and finish their connection according to a standard
connection establishment protocol such as TCP. The period of validation for this
connection is within a certain time Tv.
2. Csm ≥ 1, which means our defending server is suspected of being under
a DoS attack
When a client sends an initial connection request and an enquiry as to whether
the server is under a DoS attack, the defending server constructs a puzzle accord-
ing to the current value of l, and sends back “Yes”, together with a set of puzzle
parameters, to the client. The server keeps a correct solution b′si for every con-
nection request i for a specified period Tw. A client uses the puzzle’s parameters
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to solve the problem and sends the solution back. The defending server compares
the two solutions, and then decides whether to proceed or drop this request. A
connection request should be dropped immediately if a solution received from a
client is incorrect, or the time for sending back a solution is beyond Tw.
7.3 Discussion
In this section, we will discuss some possible attack scenarios and problems that occur
when a defending server implements the TCPS. Solutions will also be discussed.
• Discussion 1
If a malicious client floods a defending server with initial connection requests by
using spoofed IP addresses or his “Zombies” (see Figure 6), how can a server
protect itself? Wasting system resources to construct and send out a puzzle for
every connection request is not an efficient approach for protecting a web server.
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Figure 7.1: A Threat To Our TCPS
The aim of such an attack is to make a defending server perform a large number
of meaningless computations for the construction of puzzles, which may lead to
the possibility of exhausting the server’s resources. Recall that a basic principle
of client puzzles in defending against DoS attacks is to force a client to consume
a large number of resources before obtaining resources from the defending server.
If we do not comply with this rule, the threat of DoS attacks still exists.
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We propose two improved solutions to defeat this threat.
Solution 1
We propose to calculate and obtain the puzzle solution pairs (ga
′
, b′s) in advance,
and store them in a secret table on a defending server, before every new time
period t starts. When there is a connection request, the server does not need to
construct a puzzle by calculating the modular multiplication for ga
′
and b′s. The
server just fetches a pair of puzzle solutions (ga
′
, b′s) from the table, keeps b
′
s,
and sends the value of ga
′
to the client. Hence, the only thing that the server
needs to do, when there is a connection request, is to select a random integer r
to generate the seed range [b′s − r, b′s − r + l] for b′c. The size of the table can be
determined by the capability of the connectivity of the defending server.
Solution 2
Before describing our second scheme, we make the following assumption for this
solution. A malicious client who deploys IP spoofing cannot intercept all the
packets sent from a defending server to the spoofed addresses. When a defending
server receives a connection request, it sends back a sequence number to determine
whether the address is bogus. The aim of this option is to alleviate an attack
via the sequence number in this first step, and then ban it in the later puzzle
verification.
When a client sends an initial connection request and an enquiry as to whether
the server is under a DoS attack, the server returns “Yes” and a sequence number
to the received IP address. If the client is willing to accept the puzzle, he should
return a value that is equal to the sequence number plus one in a strict time period
Ts. After receiving the correct sequence number in a valid time period, the server
generates and sends a cryptographic puzzle to the client. Otherwise, the server
will drop the service request immediately. The sequence number is a filter for
spoofed IP addresses which works under the above assumption. A legitimate
client has to simply solve a puzzle and send the solution in a given time Tw to
obtain the final service. If the solution is correct, the server will proceed with
the rest of the connection request and distribute the system’s resources to the
client. On the other hand, if the answer is wrong or the time for computation is
beyond the given time Tw, the server will drop this request. If a connection is
established, the period of validation for this connection is within a specified time
Tv.
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Figure 7.2: Using A Sequence Number Against IP Spoofing
• Discussion 2
Compared with a hash-based puzzle, in which a defending server does not need
to store any client information while a client is solving the puzzle, our scheme
requires a defending server to store a solution b′s. These are two totally different
purposes. The hash approach sacrifices CPU time in the verification process to
avoid any memory becoming exhausted. Our trapdoor-based puzzle conducts a
reverse activity. We note that the final decision should be made by the server
administrators, who are aware of which resources are more valuable for their own
systems.
• Discussion 3
The main goals of our client puzzle schemes are to defend network servers against
DoS attacks, and ensure that legitimate clients gain qualified service as long as
they can solve the puzzles. However, some DoS attacks may aim to take down
clients’ machines, where an attacker may broadcast false puzzles to consume a
client’s resources.
In this case, the current solution (for example, the puzzle scheme proposed by
Aura [5]) is to make puzzles signed by the defending server. When receiving a
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puzzle, a client first verifies the signature by using the public key of the defending
server, and then computes it. Since the number of puzzles for a legitimate client
is very small, the cost of public-key verification on the client’s side is usually
acceptable.
• Discussion 4
Our TCPS and two proposed puzzle schemes can be applied to all network servers
which are based on TCP connection, such as telnet, Web or email, or SSL/TLS
[21]. The software for puzzle construction and computation can be homogenous
and centrally distributed. Different servers can obtain diverse puzzle systems by
changing a series of parameters in the schemes, for example, the large primes
(e.g. p, q), the constant sets (e.g. A, GA), and so on. Clients need to download
the software only once, and are then able to solve all types of puzzles, according
to parameters and equations published by servers.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis began with a brief introduction about the achievements of today’s Internet,
along with an overview of the major security threats to its development. Our work
in this thesis, however, has only focused on studying and preventing one of these
threats: Denial-of-Service (DoS), which is believed to create massive destruction in
open communication networks.
By reviewing the history of DoS, we have acknowledged that Denial-of-Service is
a macro definition for the result of all intentional/accidental actions that can cause
service to be degraded or interrupted. A DoS attack is specifically referred to in
our work as a malicious action which attempts to render an Internet service provider
incapable of supplying normal service to legitimate clients.
To illuminate the attack theory, we have demonstrated a number of representative
examples of DoS attacks, in which Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are
relatively new and possess more significant power by controlling “Zombie” armies and
mounting cooperated attacks on victim hosts or networks. We have classified these
attacks in two distinct ways according to their characteristics.
Several proposed countermeasures have been analysed, such as Ingress/Egress Fil-
tering and Packets Marking. An analysis of their advantages and limitations has been
presented in Chapter 2. Compared with these methods, client puzzles appear to be
more reasonable and more practical to protect web servers against resource depletion
attacks. We have described the robustness of client puzzles, which force suspected
attackers (including all legitimate clients and real attackers) to invest their compu-
tational resources in an authentication process before a defending server allocates its
memory and processing time.
However, we have also found that most proposed puzzle constructions are incapable
of meeting the demands of tackling large amounts of high-speed incoming requests. In
85
86
the most severe cases, the client puzzle mechanism itself may become a target of DoS
attacks. By examining two proposed puzzle schemes, we have summarised current
problems and provided our recommendations.
Since puzzle distribution and verification can be subject to DoS attacks, we have
proposed a novel model for puzzle construction, called the Trapdoor-based Client Puz-
zle System (TCPS). As long as it satisfies the security conditions we have defined,
any cryptographic algorithm can be adapted to this model to construct puzzles. Our
TCPS can overcome the problems encountered by previous puzzle schemes, such as the
complexity of construction and verification, solution collision, and so on.
Moreover, we have developed two puzzle schemes in this thesis, and demonstrated
that both of them are efficient with low computational costs, and can be deployed in
connection with the Client Puzzle Protocol [33] or other existing network protocols
(e.g. TCP/IP, SSL). We have also provided complete security proof for each respective
scheme.
The common attributes of our new puzzle schemes are outlined as follows:
• The defending server sends the client a puzzle whose solution requires a brute-
force search and a number of modular exponentiations to satisfy a given equation.
• The difficulty level of puzzles is parameterised according to the server load. In
addition, the average computational costs on the client’s side can be predicted
by the server.
• The security of both puzzle schemes is guaranteed by some hard problems in
mathematics, such as the Factorisation and the Discrete Logarithm.
• Most of the computations can be accomplished in the pre-construction phase.
Due to the special cryptographic properties of puzzles, pre-computed items can
be reused in connection with time parameters, and newly generated puzzles still
appear random.
• Most significantly, a quick verification for puzzle solutions can be achieved, which
relies on the uniqueness of solutions. The server is able to obtain a unique solution
when a puzzle is created, then compare it with the answer received from the client.
Hence, there is no computation in the verification phase.
After describing two puzzle schemes, we have proposed a configuration of system
parameters to help the defending server detect DoS attacks and start up the client
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puzzle protection. A discussion on further attacks was presented, and we noted that
while client puzzles are promising in terms of being able to mitigate the damage of
DoS attacks, a large number of research issues are still waiting to be resolved in the
future.
Future Work
The TCPS introduced in this thesis is a first step towards setting up a framework
to solve the problems that exist in current puzzle constructions. More cryptographic
algorithms are expected to be found and adapted to this model. The results of our
two specific puzzle schemes have been theoretically proved in this thesis. It would be
exciting to come up with a real system in which we can determine their effectiveness
through experiments.
In addition, as analysed in Chapter 2, many reasons contribute to the prevalence of
DoS/DDoS attacks today, which include both network problems and individual prob-
lems. Client puzzles are designed to improve the Internet’s protocol, which aims at
remedying network defects. Other solutions should arise from effective Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDS) or antivirus systems to tackle individual problems. Currently, client
puzzles can only mitigate DoS attacks, but cannot stop them. We suggest combining
puzzle schemes with other countermeasures to achieve this goal in the future.
Another interesting issue is that our work in this thesis focuses only on how to
defend network servers against resource depletion attacks by using client puzzles. In
fact, this mechanism can also be used to defeat network congestion or bandwidth
depletion attacks by asking a sender to solve puzzles if he/she intends to send out a
large traffic load. However, few people have noticed this topic to date, and it still is
an open research question.
In conclusion, we summarise possible future work as follows:
• Implement the two puzzle schemes proposed in this thesis and perform experi-
ments on their effectiveness.
• Study how to control the complexity of client puzzles to maximise a defending
server’s unitisation in practice.
• Cooperate with other countermeasures, such as Packet Marking or Traceback IP,
to trace suspected packets to their source IP addresses. Finally, identify and
remove “Zombies”, “Masters”, and even true attackers.
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• Extend the applications of client puzzles to relevant security fields.
The concept of client puzzles is a relatively new topic in network security, and there-
fore few implementations have so far been proposed. We hope that our research has
provided some valuable recommendations, which will be beneficial to other researchers
in this field.
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